May 2025
The Third Rail of British Politics
How to repair the UK-EU relationship without getting burned
Photography from The Remains of Love by Jez Coulson, a photographic epitaph to the Europe of 28.
“I just think [Brexit] is probably one of the biggest mistakes ever made.”
– Man, Reform Voter, Bolton South
Foreword
Author and Former Downing Street Director of Communications and Strategy
By Alastair Campbell
There are moments in history when nations risk choosing their own decline. For the UK, June 23rd 2016 was one such moment. The Brexit referendum, a response to Tory divisions rather than national interest, fuelled by promises that have turned out to be false, marked a profound break from our closest trading partner. It also diminished our role as a respected, outward-facing global power.
It won’t be easy, but it is recoverable, provided we get back to being serious.
For too long the national debate on the UK-EU relationship, in both politics and media, has been deliberately disconnected from reality. Fact twisted into fiction, hard evidence ignored for fear of “re-opening divisions” and Britain left falling behind while the world around us changes at speed.
Brexit is not simply one of many issues in a time of turmoil and challenge. It has been the single biggest act of harm to our country’s economic strength, political influence and global reputation in modern times. Ignoring this fact or pretending otherwise is not just dishonest, it is dangerous.
But there is hope. Across the country, there is a strong and growing baseline of support for a closer, more constructive relationship with Europe. People know our future lies in partnership, not isolation. It is time to overcome the suspicion and mistrust that were created in the Brexit years so we can work together to solve the big challenges of our time - sluggish economic growth, wealth inequality within and between nations, climate change, defence and security at a time of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and a clear shift under President Trump away from security guarantees we perhaps took for granted for too long.
For those of us who care about our place in the world, as all patriots should, we cannot afford to be swept up by nostalgia or the constant reliving of past arguments. We must address the issues as they confront us now and tackle the emotive force of far-right attacks that threaten to unravel our base of support. Last time, when we fought the referendum, these attacks helped do real damage to our cause. This time, armed with so much evidence of what has gone wrong, and a clearer understanding of what practical steps can be taken to undo the damage, we have a chance to push for a better deal than the disaster that was negotiated by Boris Johnson.
This is not about being pro- or anti- Europe any more. It is about the patriotic self interest in ensuring we get the economic and military security we need. Good relationships with good, like-minded people are a big part of the answer to the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s Russia. A closer relationship with the EU, one that tears down the barriers Brexit has erected against trade, offers a solution to the cost-of-living crisis. Only by offering real hope can we finally defeat the fear that the populists have been exploiting for the last decade.
This report sets out how to meet these objectives. It details how to navigate public attitudes, and develop messaging and policy to take that first step to a closer relationship with the European Union. Because we must get a closer relationship. Britain’s future is at stake - and this time, we have to get it right.
Introduction
Director of the Good Growth Foundation
By Praful Nargund
There is a live wire that has snaked its way down Whitehall, across Fleet Street and onto the dinner table of every home in the UK: Brexit. Like electrified train tracks, the issue has been fatal to touch. Until recently, received wisdom has been to pretend it isn’t there. Don’t look at it, and maybe it will go away. Don’t touch it, and you won’t get a nasty shock. However, five years on from Exit Day, the country is starting to smell something burning.
Nothing illustrates this more than Andrew Bailey urging the Government in November 2024 to “rebuild relations” with the European Union (EU). Governors of the Bank of England notoriously stay out of contentious political issues, but even Bailey had to politely “point out consequences” as he put it.
Reams of economic data, financial reports and academic studies show Brexit has been bad for Britain. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) estimates it will cause trade to decline in the long-term by 15% and reduce productivity by 4%, relative to remaining in the EU. Researchers based at the London School of Economics found British exports had already reduced by 6.4% in 2022. This has naturally been noticed by many in Government, with Chancellor Rachel Reeves stressing a “reset” of the UK-EU relationship is urgently needed.
It is safe to say everyone is aware Brexit has held back our economy. Not least Brexiteers themselves, whose victory lap was notably cut short in 2022 when they abolished the Minister for Brexit Opportunities after no real opportunities could be found. Public polling, like Best for Britain’s and our own, now show high levels of “Bregret”. Consequently, many Remain supporters argue that politicians advocating for closer alignment would be pushing at an open door.
However, the fact of the matter is Brexit is still the third rail of British politics. While voters feel let down by our current settlement with the EU, the same attitudes that led to it in the first place remain.
In Mind the Growth Gap, published in January 2025, we argued that the link between economic growth and rising living standards has been broken. Since the 2008 recession, wages have stagnated while returns on capital have remained healthy. People watch industries like tech and finance boom, as they are excluded from the successes. Instead, they see themselves left with rising prices, higher taxes, declining public services and increasingly insecure work.
The straightforward economic argument for closer alignment with the EU is therefore a tempting solution. Unfortunately, it is not so easy.
Global trade has been fundamentally altered by Donald Trump’s second term in the White House. Tariffs and trade wars will rock the international economic order. New alliances and partnerships will be created; old ones will be left to the wayside. And yet, little has changed regarding the British public’s attitude towards the EU. Indeed, it seems nothing has changed over the past 45 years.
Our research shows the public is still nervous about signing up to the political structures of Europe, still anxious about losing sovereignty and “surrendering” to the EU. These concerns must be managed carefully if the UK is to have a successful relationship with Europe and attain the economic benefits that people want and so desperately need.
We present the first steps on the path forward. Our policy proposals offer a means of repairing the UK-EU relationship for economic growth and are designed to overcome the British public’s reservations. Security, national as well as economic, is key.
The UK cannot afford another decade of drift, but the political reality is that the ground is fraught with trip-wires. This report sets out how we can build a new consensus without opening old wounds. A consensus that is rooted in shared interests, mutual security and the everyday economic reality of people across the country. We offer a credible, politically viable route to engagement with Europe. Because the debate is no longer whether to touch the third rail, but how to grapple it.
I would like to thank JL Partners for conducting our polling as well as all of those who offered their brilliant expertise on the topics discussed, particularly Lord Liddle, Allie Renison, Sam Lowe, Anton Spisak, Josh Arnold-Forster and Adam Berman.
“The big sort of selling points at the time was [Brexit] was going to reduce immigration and obviously it was costing us a lot as well to be in Europe. But what seems to have happened as a result is there’s probably more immigration now … and we’re paying a lot more … maybe it was a bad idea.”
- Man, Conservative-Labour Swing Voter, Montgomeryshire and Glyndwr
Executive Summary
This report sets out a strategy for navigating one of the most politically charged issues in the UK: rebuilding ties with the European Union (EU). For too long, Brexit has been the third rail of our politics, shocking anyone who dares touch it. But the cost-of-living crisis and global instability are causing Britons and key voters to think again. Nearly three-quarters of Labour-Reform switchers, who voted Labour in 2024 and are now supporting Reform, want to either rejoin (35%) or have a closer relationship with the EU but not rejoin (39%). From Russia’s aggression to Donald Trump’s unpredictability, British voters are being pushed towards a closer relationship with the EU.
62% of all Britons, 60% of Labour-Leave voters and 53% of Labour-Reform Switchers back joining forces with the EU against unpredictable partners in a forced choice against doubling down on the special relationship with America.
73% of Britons support “some” or “a lot” of cooperation with the EU on trade and the economy (75% Labour-Reform Switchers), 71% on security and defence (73% Labour-Reform Switchers).
But the terrain is still volatile. Red lines on immigration, British sovereignty and political integration make Labour-Reform switchers particularly vulnerable to attack messaging. Attacks like “Keir’s surrender” dropped support for closer EU ties by 16 points. To navigate these pitfalls, the pragmatic policies that address the public’s concerns about security - economic as well as national - while respecting Brexit red lines must be prioritised. A strategic approach is needed. One that frames EU cooperation as being in our patriotic self-interest and focuses on practical gains in security and the cost-of-living.
Key Findings
67% of Labour 2024 voters and 60% of Labour Leave voters back joining forces with the EU against unpredictable partners in a forced choice against doubling down on the special relationships with the US, with 53% of Labour-Reform Switchers.
Britons are more likely to view Donald Trump as the biggest threat to UK national interests than terrorist organisations (24% and 22%) respectively, second only to Russia (34%).
Almost half of Britons think Donald Trump will worsen the UK’s economy (47%) and safety and security (45%).
Voters say that one of the worst thing about Nigel Farage is his closeness to Donald Trump (29% overall and 25% of Labour-Reform Switchers).
Most Labour-Reform switchers and Labour Leave voters see the EU as our most trustworthy allies (50% and 53% respectively).
Voters say that any deal with the EU must lower the cost of living. The most frequently chosen top three priorities for the public are decreasing energy (51%), food prices (48%), and the cost of goods and services (46%).
The public has clear red lines - and with the exception of “rejoining the EU” altogether - they diverge from the Government’s red lines.
The most popular dealbreaker amongst those keen to get closer to the EU is ‘Allowing EU boats and fishing greater access to UK waters (38% overall, 31% of Labour-Reform Switchers, and 30% Labour Leave voters).
Over a third of voters (34%) want to restrict access to public services and benefits for EU citizens (33% of Labour-Reform Switchers and 29% of Labour Leave voters).
There is also little appetite for EU jurisdiction, with 31% rejecting European Court of Justice oversight of a UK-EU deal (28% of Labour-Reform Switchers and 23% of Labour Leavers).
Recommendations
Counter Eurosceptic attacks with proactive messaging that highlights how EU cooperation strengthens national security, cuts living costs and respects the referendum result. Tested messages such as “Stronger together”, “Britain wins big” and “No red lines crossed” shifted support for a deal by up to five points.
Negotiate a UK-EU Youth Mobility Scheme that is capped, contributory and time-limited. This approach can deliver up to £1bn in annual fiscal benefits and address the British public’s concerns about immigration while helping meet EU priorities in negotiations.
Unify UK-EU carbon and electricity markets to strengthen energy security, reduce household bills and support green energy. Market alignment could generate up to £1.6 billion in new tax revenues and save up to £370 million annually.
Avoid European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction through an independent arbitration mechanism to govern UK-EU cooperation on trade, energy and defence. Modeled on the EU-Switzerland agreement, this approach allows limited ECJ reference for EU law interpretation without direct oversight. It addresses sovereignty concerns, supports practical cooperation and neutralises “surrender” narratives that threaten to derail public support.
Establish a UK-EU Defence and Security Pact to enhance UK military capabilities and gain access to the €150 billion SAFE fund for joint procurement and R&D. This would strengthen deterrence against Russia and reduce costs to the UK taxpayer.
Methodology
The political context for this work is the rise of Reform UK, originally founded on the basis of Euroscepticism. There is a widespread fear in politics that the backlash to any effort to move closer to Europe will be centred on voters interested in Reform’s agenda. We have therefore made the views of voters leaning towards Reform central to our methodology. We have analysed in isolation the views of Labour to Reform swing voters in our polling, as well as Labour voters who voted to leave the EU in 2016. Additionally, we spoke to those with various levels of receptiveness to Reform as part of our focus groups.
This report is based on:
1 x nationally representative online poll of 2,209 GB adults, with an oversample of 222 Labour-Reform Switchers, conducted by JL Partners between March 14th and March 19th 2025.
Disclaimer: In this poll results have been rounded up or down to the nearest whole number to remove the decimal place in our results tables and graphs. Due to rounding, totals may not always sum to 100%.6 x focus groups, running across three evenings (February 12th, February 26th and April 2nd 2025).
6 x focus groups, running across three evenings (February 12th, February 26th and April 2nd 2025).
1 x group with Labour-Reform Considerers: 2024 Labour voters now open to voting Reform.
2 x groups with Labour-Reform Switchers: 2024 Labour voters who are disappointed with the Government and say they will vote Reform.
2x groups with Reform Voters: 2024 Reform voters who are planning to vote Reform again.
1 x group with Conservative-Labour Swing Voters: 2024 Labour voters who have voted Conservative in the past and are open to voting Conservative in the future.
Section 1
The Politics of Empty Growth
The promise of a rising tide lifts all boats is broken. Coupled with increased concern about Donald Trump and Russia, Britons are more anxious about the future than they have been in recent times.
Since 2008, there has been a fundamental shift in how people from Western democracies relate to the economy. It is this shift that helps explain Brexit, the ascent of Donald Trump and the rise of Reform. It is a key part of the Labour Party’s success in 2024, and it is why “vote rejoin” could well lose a second EU referendum - no matter what our, or anyone else’s, polls say.
Now, few believe that a strong economy will benefit them. The trust that economic growth will improve people’s living standards is well and truly broken. For too many, growth has come to mean rising profits at the top and stagnant wages for everyone else. Unaffordable housing, deteriorating public services and the ever-climbing cost-of-living signal that ordinary people are being left behind while the rich keep getting richer.
It’s no longer, as James Carville once put it, “the economy, stupid”. Because, when growth is achieved without making a positive difference to people’s lives, it results in electoral failure - just look at the Biden administration in the US. If the numbers go up while the public feels poorer, it becomes clear to the electorate that someone else is winning and they are losing.
This collapse in confidence is reshaping our politics and fuelling disillusionment, volatility and populism. The UK witnessed it during the 2016 referendum campaign, as one heckler famously shouted in a viral moment, “That’s your bloody GDP. Not ours”. In Mind the Growth Gap, we found that aspiration in the UK is in the gutter. People simply want the basic financial security to get by, unable to even dream of getting ahead. Populism has become the answer to an economy that no longer works for people.
However, the mistake would be to go down the pure economic argument for a closer relationship with the EU. Yes, the evidence is there for all to see. But our research shows that this is not convincing enough to a public completely disillusioned with current political and economic structures. Nevermind that the approach was tried and failed during the referendum.
The way forward is to focus on how a closer relationship with the EU can defend the UK against increasingly unstable geopolitical and economic forces. The second Trump presidency has shown many Britons that the US is not the ally they once thought it was. Compounded with the growing threat of Russia, the UK is much more willing to stand with Europe than it has been in the recent past. Trump and Vladimir Putin are pushing the British public back towards the EU. This is the starting point for all further discussion on the UK-EU relationship.
“Everyone’s Struggling it seems. You know, just even to get, like, food on the table … the cost-of-living is extreme.”
– Woman, Reform Voter, Newport West and Islwyn
“We are closer to European countries than we are to the Americas. And even when you look at NATO, when Article Five was activated. It was after 9/11 so all the NATO countries went to support America in the war in Afghanistan … So, we are closer to the European countries and if anything was to happen nearby they would come to us or we’d go to them … I don’t see Trump in his mind today, in his mindset today, coming to our rescue at all.”
– Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Bolsover
Transatlantic Tension
1.1
Though Trump appears to be drilling political divides in the US to new depths, here in the UK he has a remarkable ability in bridging them. Both the British left and right are united in their disapproval of the President. Even before he imposed crippling tariffs on the global economy and ignited a (likely to be) disastrous trade war with China, Britons were clear that Trump is firmly out of step with UK national interests.
The concern about Trump is more than a few unfavourable comments thrown around in our focus groups (“loose cannon”, “madman” and “scary” to name a few). There is genuine fear that he poses a threat to the UK and the wider world. Our polling even found that the public view him as a greater threat to UK safety than “terrorist groups”. One in four Britons regard Trump as the biggest threat to UK national interests; 22% chose terrorist groups and 10% China. The only actor seen as more dangerous than Trump is Russia (34%).
“I fear he is a dangerous man … I just think he could be responsible for leading us into another war somehow.”
- Woman, Reform Voter, Erewash
“Now more than ever, it’s like imperative that we keep our allies in Europe, especially with the Trump stuff going on.”
- Woman, Conservative-Labour Swing Voter, Rossendale and Darwen
How does this relate to the EU? Well, it makes it look like an even better friend. Across the political spectrum, and by a hefty margin, the public see the EU as a more reliable trading partner than the US. Over half of Britons agree (50% for Labour-Reform Switchers) the EU is our most trustworthy ally at the present moment, compared to only 22% backing the US (27% for Labour-Reform Switchers).
The Trump administration’s support for Russia over Ukraine and its protectionist economic policies has spurred a mood shift in British public opinion towards the EU. To many, he represents the unpredictable geopolitical order we now face. The fantasy of a “Singapore on Thames” - a Britain thriving as a hyper-globalised, lightly regulated economic powerhouse - was never grounded in reality. But now, in an era of instability, protectionism and the fraying of traditional alliances (as embodied by figures like Trump), it has been exposed to be not just naïve, but dangerously outdated.
Furthermore, nearly 2 in 3 Britons are more likely to agree that “the Trump Presidency means it’s imperative that we join forces with the EU” when compared to the sentiment that “the Trump Presidency creates a big opportunity. From outside the EU we can cement our special relationship with America.” All the key voter groups we studied favour the former statement over the latter, including Labour-Reform Switchers.
Across our focus groups, we could see the mood harden against Trump in real time. On February 12th, Reform Considerers and Conservative-Labour Swing Voters were receptive to strengthening the UK-US “special relationship”. But only a fortnight later, on February 26th, Labour-Reform Switchers and Reform Voters had turned against the US. Almost all of the most pro-Reform voters believed the UK should choose Europe.
This does not imply that the British Government should forge ahead, full throttle, towards closer alignment with the EU. Throughout our qualitative research, a third option appeared: neither. Few voters want to side with Trump, but they are not naturally viewing the two options as a choice. There is an isolationist mood in the air, especially among Labour-Reform Switchers, causing many to say the UK should avoid picking a side altogether. Given Trump’s capriciousness, people are worried about appearing to go against him. Some suggested we should simply sit it out.
This is an impulse to be cautious of, particularly when it comes to debates on the economy and national security. Across the variety of topics we studied, a deep anxiety about globalisation came through. As one Labour-Reform Switcher said: “The carrots that the children have in school are imported from Japan…that’s how dire it is.”
Many believe the UK needs to stand on its own two feet, economically and militarily. This sentiment comes up again and again. And so, yes, Britons see the EU as a better partner than the US, but only if it does not interfere with our ability to thrive independently.
The Beast from the East
1.2
The only person Britons view as a greater threat than Donald Trump is Vladimir Putin, and this is particularly true of voters drawn to Reform. Putin is the ultimate bogeyman, a symbol of warmongering, authoritarianism and democratic decay. He sits at the pinnacle of people’s deep unease about the world. Looming across the continent, he imbues the sense that liberal democracy is more fragile than ever and we must rally to protect it (and ourselves).
Similar to Trump, the war against Ukraine has pushed the British public to deal with the stark geopolitical consequences of Brexit. There is significant pride in the British state’s strong response to Russian aggression, but also a growing recognition that we cannot go it alone. It is clear that a threat so grave and destabilising requires close cooperation with our European allies. 60% of all Britons, rising to 66% of Labour-Reform Switchers, agree that we need to have a closer relationship with the EU because“in response to Russia, our national security is stronger in partnership with the EU.” In this context, sovereignty is increasingly understood not just as independence, but as interdependence - the ability to stand tall by standing together.
Putin and Trump are closely linked in the minds of voters, often as the two faces of the same coin. Trump’s hostile exchange with President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office epitomised what many already thought: the US is now much too close to Russia for comfort. As a result, voters feel the UK can no longer place unquestioning trust in the US as a steady partner. With danger looming from both east and west, Europe has become the mast to which many Britons now tie their sense of security.
“Since [Trump] sided with Putin, I just think it puts us in [a] really dangerous place that we need to just now unite with Europe.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, South Derbyshire
Section 2
Regret But No Return
Britons think Brexit was a mistake - but that does not mean they want to undo it. Though disillusioned with the outcome, many still look towards its promise of control.
On the surface, everything has changed when it comes to Britons' relationship with Europe. Yet, when you dig deeper, traditional concerns remain. The public certainly regard the decision to leave as a mistake, or at least a monumental waste of time. But, for much the same reason as they were ambivalent about membership in the first place, they are still wary of the political structures of Europe. Brexit regret has done nothing to quell Britons desire to see the country stand as a strong, independent actor.
“I think we were lied to, on the off right until the death when it was all signed over. Obviously, I opted to leave.”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Warrington North
Rehashing Brexit
2.1
“I think for a lot of people, the reason we voted leave was immigration and control the borders [as] promised us. And, if anything, the figures are higher now than they were back then.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Rochdale
Frankly, nobody thinks Brexit has worked out well. Not one person we spoke to could cite a single positive outcome. Answers on what went wrong vary across different voting groups, but there was no question that it did go wrong.
Nearly half of Britons (51% of Labour-Reform Switchers) now say that the UK was wrong to leave the EU and, when you ask about its outcomes, many of the 40% who stand by the decision will tell you that it resulted in failure. Even Reform voters take a dim view of Brexit. Often, they maintain it as the right decision for the time, but still think it has ended in disaster. Brexit would have been better, they believe, if COVID had not hit or if the politicians of the day had not botched the process. A classic case of correct policy but poor execution. Labour-Reform Switchers, on the other hand, tend to agree with everyone else - that Brexit was a mistake full stop. Many feel they were lied to, or did not have enough good information to make an informed decision. Others suggested the public simply should not have been asked.
There is a clear cause of this “Bregret” - voters believe life in the UK has taken a turn for the worse since the referendum. Naturally, they wish it had not happened. From higher food prices to rising immigration, deteriorating public services to faltering national security, Britons sense life has become harder, more uncertain and less hopeful. People wait years for much needed surgery, they struggle to afford the basics and despair at the lack of opportunity granted for their children. There’s a sense of lost control, diminished standing in the world and that the potential for a better future has evaporated. Though some maintain their support for Brexit, every voter group in Britain believes near every aspect of public life has been negatively affected by the referendum result.
Yet, focus group participants were more circumspect. International turmoil since 2016 has made it difficult for people to disentangle how much Brexit is to blame for the UK’s present problems. The pandemic and Putin often loom larger in their minds. It is clear the vast majority believe things have become worse since Brexit, but they do not necessarily see a Brexit as having made them worse.
The connection between Brexit and the cost-of-living-crisis is the most readily apparent. Border checks, additional charges and regulatory misalignment that cause goods to be more expensive are understood intuitively by many. However, while agreeing that the removal of these hurdles would not hurt, most do not see Brexit as the catalyst for higher prices.
Far fewer focus group participants made the connection between NHS staff shortages and Brexit. Mostly, this idea is confided to Reform Considerers and the most regretful of the Labour-Reform Switchers. As with the cost-of-living crisis, the sentiment was that being outside the EU has not helped, but nor has it actively caused harm. Like those who responded to our polling, they would readily agree that Brexit has its problems, but they would clarify it is not the reason for the country’s difficulties.
It was least obvious to participants how illegal immigration has increased due to Brexit. We explained in detail why this would be the case, but the message never fully landed. Again, people agree Brexit has done nothing to solve illegal immigration, but it is not at all clear how moving away from the bloc has made things worse.
Consequently, the “buyer’s remorse” felt by Leave voters does not immediately translate to a desire to rejoin. The causal links just are not there. Brexit is an ill-fitting piece of clothing, bought in a moment of madness. It hangs in the wardrobe, unused and unworn. But it’s too late to get our money back now.
“I can definitely see this increase in cost-of-living. I don't know if that's something to do with Brexit. But, yeah, there’s definitely more struggles trying to be independent.”
- Woman, Reform Voter, Newport West and Islwyn
Where We Go from Here
2.2
The proportion who favoured rejoining the EU in our polling closely mirrored the proportion of those who regretted leaving. But, according to the public, there is no serious prospect of the UK becoming a member state again. Voters are not genuinely eager to rejoin. Almost all voting groups, including Labour Leavers, are united in saying Britain should move closer to Europe, and those in favour of this strategy are significantly larger than those favourable to rejoin.
There are two distinct groups within the “closer relationship” camp. One believes the UK should actively and materially align with the EU. This group is bought into the idea of more formal alliances. The other argues the relationship as it is now is about right, but better cooperation would be useful. This group likes the idea of greater collaboration and respect, but is less keen on structural changes to the relationship.
However, across the board, there are two vital areas people want to see movement on: defence and the economy. Nearly seven in ten people want “a lot” or “some” cooperation with the EU on security and defence, and 68% want the same on trade and the economy.
“It’s a big market you’re closing off or making hard for yourself. There are other countries, but further away … It does seem as though you’re operating with your arm up your back.”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Stalybridge & Hyde
2.2.1 Good Relationships with Good People
“I think we’re stronger altogether … We’re not the great British army that we used to be. I think we do need to join forces. We need to show solidarity against the bullies like Russia and China and America. They are massive, aren’t they? And I think we’re strength in numbers.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Rochdale
There is fear that the country is more exposed to international volatility and conflict. Whether it is war in Ukraine or tensions in the Middle East, many Britons feel the world is becoming more dangerous and unpredictable. This sense of unease is not confined to distant events - it extends to concerns about the UK’s resilience at home, including fears of economic shocks, rising prices and pressures on public services. President Trump particularly fuels this anxiety. We found people are 25 points more likely to believe the Trump presidency will weaken national safety and security than strengthen it, and 28 points more likely to think his return to office will harm the economy rather than improve it. These figures highlight a wider perception that major powers are becoming less stable and that Britain is increasingly vulnerable to the ripple effects of global disorder.
The palpable sense that the international environment is shifting in ways that could make the country less safe and less prosperous leads many to be open towards cooperation with the EU on defence. Joint military procurement was particularly popular in our focus groups and 61% of Britons agree we must consider closer defence integration with Europe, including joint procurement and military coordination. Many instinctively understand that this would allow us to share costs and equipment while attracting investment and strengthening our own defence industry.
The relative popularity of pooling some British forces into an EU army was surprising, given that political wisdom has always thought it completely unthinkable. Several focus group participants said they could see sense in the idea, including Reform Voters and Labour-Reform Switchers, and in polling more supported than opposed it (34% of all Britons and 39% Labour-Reform Switchers support; 29% Britons and 26% Labour-Reform Switchers opposed). While it is incredibly unlikely that a European army will actually materialise and the figures by no means show it as an overwhelmingly popular idea, it does illustrate the public’s increasingly open attitude towards military partnerships with the EU.
“By saying good relationships with good people that, you know, does make you feel like you want to trust in the people.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Bridgend
However, as is the case with the economy, many want the UK to bolster its military capability more broadly, independent of the EU as well as in conjunction with it. Nearly 80% of Labour-Reform Switchers (68% for all Britons) agree we need to rebuild our defence industry to improve our security and create British jobs, and 62% of Labour-Reform switchers (60% of Britons) believe we must increase defence spending as our national interests are under threat. While many see the benefits of strength in numbers and thus want to work with the EU on defence, this must not be construed as the UK becoming reliant on others for our own protection. Rather, there is a clear desire for strategic autonomy - cooperation where it serves British interests, but underpinned by sovereign capabilities
Furthermore, in focus groups, the concern that Britain would end up propping up every one else was palpable. Reform Voters were particularly suspicious that Britain would be over-generous, and pay more than its fair share. Many look at our cash-strapped Government and recoil at the thought of paying for others' protection. There is a mood of fiscal caution and national self-interest causing some anxiety of open-ended commitments that do not deliver a clear return for the UK. While there is certainly support for cooperation with the EU, it is conditional and transactional, rooted in a belief that British contributions must be matched by tangible benefits for the UK’s own security and prosperity.
A closer relationship on defence must therefore be a support, not a crutch, and bolster ourselves as well as others. To voters, national security is the obvious starting point for greater cooperation with the EU and it is a theme that runs deep in the British psyche. One of the simplest but most effective arguments we tested was: “In an unstable world, we need to build good relationships with good people” (89% agreement from Labour-Reform switchers; 79% Britons). As the public grasps for greater safety and security, the EU makes for a compelling partner to improve the UK’s standing. If the Government can argue it is “doing more with less” by greater integrating military procurement for example, even better.
2.2.2 Economic Strength for National Security
Economic security is increasingly intertwined with national security in voters’ minds, reflecting a broader understanding that a strong economy underpins our resilience against all manners of threats. Global instability, the cost-of-living crisis and energy dependency have made people more aware that economic strength is vital for safeguarding our national interests, at home and abroad. Furthermore, Trump has highlighted the economic risks of isolation from major trading partners. Many are thus beginning to view the EU less as a bureaucratic burden and more as a necessary shield in an increasingly volatile global market.
Removing trade barriers and supporting UK businesses are among the top reasons for a closer relationship with the EU according to voters. 83% of Labour-Reform switchers and three-quarters of all Britons say the UK should have closer relations with the EU to remove trade barriers and reduce the price of food and other essentials. Again, 83% of Labour-Reform Switchers and 75% of all Britons think we should align to support UK businesses and grow the economy. In focus groups, people railed against the inefficiencies and arbitrariness of trade barriers and customs checks. With the cost-of-living crisis weighing heavily on people’s minds, these bottlenecks are rightly seen as unnecessarily adding costs to necessities.
The cost-of-living crisis erodes people’s sense of control, adds to their anxieties about the future and strikes at the very core of individual security and dignity. It is no surprise that it was the issue that animated focus groups most and generated the greatest enthusiasm for EU cooperation. The public’s top three priorities for a deal with the EU are: reducing energy prices (51%), food prices (48%) and the cost of goods and services (46%).
“I think things [like] exports and imports, especially … I mean, obviously everything else will fall in line. Because if, you know, the cost of the food and things are less, then cost-of-living is going to go down as well if we can import all the goods, you know, for less.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Bridgend
However, the fault lines of the referendum still remain. Focus groups expressed deep concern that closer economic ties with the EU would lead to increased immigration. Most people see Brexit as making immigration levels neither worse nor better. But, given that levels of immigration are now higher than they were in 2016, the imperative to control Britain’s borders has become even stronger. There is also no love lost for the political structures of the EU. Allowing the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to oversee a UK-EU deal came up as one of voters' key redlines. Both these concerns will need to be overcome for the UK and EU to strike a successful trading relationship.
It appears the public’s “ideal” relationship with the EU remains as contradictory as it ever was: maximum free trade combined with minimum compromise. And yet, freedom of movement is not the red line it once was. Over 40% of Britons now support reintroducing the policy, while just over 20% oppose doing so. And support comes from Labour Leavers and Labour-Reform Switchers alike, though both groups are more likely to oppose the policy that Britons overall (28% and 29% respectively). The same is true of policies relating to common trade and set food standards, the public has no problem with the UK cooperating on these fronts.
When we showed focus groups a variety of options for the future of legal migration between the UK and the EU, almost every participant opted for more open and flexible approaches than that we have now. Reform Voters, for instance, praised the Youth Mobility Scheme as a pragmatic step forward. Many lamented that older people would not be able to participate and most were even open to full freedom of movement (provided it did not cross a key red line: EU citizens barred from access to council housing and benefits). But there remained a wariness of losing control of our borders, a suspicion that immigrants may not be contributing their fair share to our economy.
“The idea of the UK to sign up the youth mobility scheme, a cultural exchange program for the under 30s. I think that seems, you know, like something I would sort of agree with. I do like that.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Rossendale and Darwen
“I think coming out of it completely, I think it just damaged our trades, everything else. It’s just caused a sort of collapse within the economy and the country. So I think we need to improve links, definitely with Europe … because I think it’s just been a disaster.”
- Man, Reform Voter, Bolton
Section 3
Old Habits Die Hard
The public is open to cooperation with the EU, but the emotional zeitgeist of Brexit - sovereignty, control, fairness - remains firmly in place.
The public is absolutely open to a closer relationship with the EU, but old habits die hard. Many of the assumptions that shaped the 2016 debate - those around immigration, sovereignty and control - continue to influence public attitudes. Forging a new consensus on the UK’s relationship with Europe will require more than policy tweaks. It demands a shift in tone and approach. That starts with engaging the public honestly about the trade-offs involved, acknowledging both the costs and benefits of cooperation. The case must be made in concrete terms, grounded in the real-world advantages to the UK economy and national security, while giving hope for a brighter future.
“The freedom of movement, of moving people, I don’t know. I think we should be able to invest more in the people that are already here to do the jobs.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Rochdale
Red Lines
3.1
As the UK considers what a closer relationship with the EU might look like, it is vital to understand the public’s red lines - the issues that remain politically and emotionally non-negotiable. We polled 12 potential red lines, identified through a combination of focus group insights, the Government’s stated positions and recurring themes in public debate and media coverage.
Apart from rejoining the EU, which 32% of Britons and 30% of Labour-Reform Switchers selected as one of their top three non-negotiables, the public’s red lines are as follows:
Allowing EU boats and fishing greater access to UK waters(38% of all Britons; 31% Labour-Reform Switchers).
Giving EU citizens and workers access to public services such as the NHS, benefits or social housing (34% Britons; 33% Labour-Reform Switchers).
Allowing the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to oversee a UK-EU deal (31% Britons; 28% Labour-Reform Switchers).
The public is looking for a deal that creates economic stability and bolsters national security without losing our highly regarded sovereignty. They see this as reasonable and, crucially, fair. People do not want to go back to the pre-Brexit days that they see as marred by a lack of reciprocity. A new arrangement must be outlined in a manner that builds on the UK’s strength, affirming control and sovereignty while opening the door to a pragmatic relationship for economic success.
Tied to this is the lack of desire to re-open the arguments of the past. While there is widespread dissatisfaction with how Brexit has unfolded, there is no want to re-fight the referendum. Voters want greater security, both in defence and economic terms, but not a return to the debates of 2016.
3.1.1 Britannia Rules the Waves
The most strongly held red line was against allowing greater access to UK waters for EU fishing boats, with 38% listing it as a dealbreaker. When asked directly whether they support or oppose EU fishing access, opposition rose to 44% across the public. Therefore, one would be forgiven for thinking voters are passionate about the politics of fishing from looking at the polling alone.
However, our focus groups found this is far from the case. When fishing was raised, concerns were less about the details of quotas and policy, and more about a broader fear of losing control. This represents an attitude that has appeared again and again throughout our research: Britons immediately balk at any thought of “surrendering”. Fishing is thus a stand-in for national sovereignty. It’s clear, tangible and historically charged. As a small island nation, our waters are our borders. We cannot give them up without a fight.
“They over-fish, right? You know, they just come in with great big trawlers instead of [...] small fishing boats [...] and they just over fish and leave nothing for anybody else.”
- Female, Labour-Reform Switcher, Erewash
3.1.2 Shutting up Shop
Unsurprisingly, immigration remains a sore spot for voters. Around a third of Labour-Reform Switchers (33%) and Labour Leavers (29%) want to restrict access to public services and benefits for EU citizens - in line with the wider public (34%). This rose to 41% opposition in a support/oppose question. In some ways, this is the most straightforward red line from the public. Immigration has been a perennial theme of our politics and media for over a decade. And despite people’s clear desire for lower levels, the numbers have gone up and up - which the public has noticed.
Net -23% (-21% for Labour-Reform Switchers) believe legal migration has become worse since Brexit and net -42% (-37% Labour-Reform Switchers) say illegal migration has worsened too. Across the political spectrum around two-thirds believe that legal migration is not selective enough and is letting in too many people. It is the same for the idea that immigrants cost the UK more than they contribute.
However, there is something constructive to be gained from this red line. People know public services are under immense strain and so are concerned that any additional demand will simply be unsustainable. If the right reassurances can be given on access to public services, many of the broader objections to immigration will likely soften. Again, it is not necessarily the principle of people coming to the UK that voters resist. It is the perceived impact on an already struggling system.
“I think they’re allowed to come in, yeah, but only if they can support themselves … You know, you come in as long as you’re working and you’re putting money back into the country.”
- Woman, Reform Voter, Heywood and Middleton
3.1.3 No Appetite for Oversight
There is little public appetite for a return to EU legal jurisdiction, with 31% rejecting European Court of Justice (ECJ) oversight of a UK-EU deal. The issue was never raised in focus groups without prompting and there is little awareness of what the ECJ actually is and does (but the connotations are not good). For many, the ECJ is simply shorthand for foreign control. The symbol of a faceless authority beyond our borders, handing down decisions without democratic accountability.
The issue is not about technical detail. It is about the optics of power. Who is in charge? Who gets the final say? These are questions that tap into the same emotional reflex as other perceived compromises - one of being told by someone else what to do. The ECJ operates on the psychological terrain on which any future EU agreement will be judged.
“Certainly rejoining the EU and the European Court of Justice are no-goers.”
- Male, Labour-Reform Switcher, Warrington North
Section 4
The Perfect Storm
Powerful attack lines - especially when delivered by strong Eurosceptic voices like Nigel Farage - can quickly erode support for closer ties with the EU. But, our message testing shows there is a path through these choppy waters.
When it comes to the politics of Europe, the right combination of message and messenger can create a particularly toxic force. Strong attack messaging, especially those tied to immigration and “surrendering” to Brussels, can be devastating. The perfect storm is created when this is paired with a potent communicator like Nigel Farage, the leader of Reform UK.
Focus group participants expressed a deep emotional reaction to the idea that the UK could once again be “dictated to” by the EU. Messaging like “Keir’s surrender: millions to flood UK in Brexit U-turn”, which suggested a new EU deal could allow over 70 million migrants into the UK, caused support for closer ties with Europe to drop by 16 points. A second attack line on a “Free movement fiasco”, claiming the UK would be forced to admit thousands of EU workers and students, drove support down by 11 points.
Farage is uniquely dangerous in this context. Despite being a major force behind the Brexit referendum in the first place, he is not widely blamed for the failures of Brexit. Among Labour-Reform Switchers his appeal remains strong, with 61% viewing him favourably. This is far above the national average of 34% and even higher than the 40% among Labour Leavers. Labour-Reform Switchers see him as someone who “tells it like it is” (55%), “defends British values” (48%) and “speaks for ordinary people (47%). Just 14% of those who think Brexit has made the country worse blame him for it. Crucially, this number is even lower among Labour-Reform Switchers (11%).
Instead, those who think Brexit has made the country worse blame Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party above all else (26% and 24% of all Britons respectively). This was even more pointed among Labour-Reform Switchers (30% and 29% respectively). Nigel Farage may have led the drumbeat to leave the EU for decades, but voters think that the responsibility for the terms of the departure must be pinned to those who promised to “Get Brexit Done.”
“The one thing we'll say about Nigel Farage, you just seem to have Britain's best interests at heart. You know, it seems, he does seem to want to put us first.”
- Male, Reform Voter, Erewash
Forging the Path Ahead
4.1
We showed research participants open to a closer relationship with the EU four negative headlines that could come from a potential deal:
Hook, Line and Sinker: Keir Starmer is offering our fishing rights up on a plate for the EU, with the EU exploiting our fish and putting fishermen out of work.
Brexit? What Brexit? Labour’s Backroom Brussels Deal: Keir Starmer accused of launching surrender squad to undo Brexit. 100-strong Whitehall unit is launched to tie Britain back to Brussels, in betrayal of the 2016 vote.
Free Movement Fiasco: Labour opens the door to tens of thousands of European workers and students as it seeks a post-Brexit free movement deal with the EU.
Keir’s Surrender Millions to Flood UK in Brexit U-Turn: Keir Starmer told to accept over 70 million migrants in fresh Brexit betrayal as EU leaders lay out major demands in return for a deal.
All headlines significantly reduced support for a closer relationship. As one focus group participant said in response: “This terrifies me... It really does. It's almost just being bullied [...] if you want anything to do with us, you're going to just do what we say. And yeah, we've been sold down the river…. He's [Keir Starmer] rolling over and letting them dictate and tell us what they want, and what are we getting in return?”
But these attacks can be countered - if addressed directly and with the right framing. Counter-messages are most effective when they are rooted in national self-interest and resonate with voters’ core values: security, prosperity and respect for the referendum result. Presenting cooperation with the EU as a practical means of delivering for the UK (on defence, the cost-of-living and sovereignty), not an ideological commitment, is persuasive even to sceptical audiences
4.1.1 Stronger Together: Labour backs EU ties to deter Putin’s threats
“We stand with our allies. We know who are friends are, and we must protect them from Putin” says Labour as they unveil a new European Relationship.
The most effective counter-message ties closer EU cooperation to strategic defence against our biggest perceived threat: Vladimir Putin. “Stronger together: Labour backs EU ties to deter Putin’s threats” resonates across the political spectrum. When shown a positive message after participants were exposed to attack messaging, it increased support for a closer relationship by five points, though not quite restoring it to original levels. This recontextualises European ties to be part of a patriotic, security-driven agenda - making clear that standing with allies is part of protecting our sovereignty, not a retreat. It engages voters’ post-Brexit desire for control by positioning the UK as an active player, choosing to work with others to keep the country safe.
4.1.2 Britain Wins Big: A new EU deal that cuts bills and backs public services
Prime Minister unveils “historic” deal to reduce cost of essentials and put more funding into the NHS.
Messages that frame a deal as a tangible win for ordinary people, particularly on the economy, are also persuasive. “Britain wins big: A new deal that cuts bills and backs public services” restores support by nearly five points. It is imperative to speak directly to the current pressures voters face. By connecting a deal with the EU to lower household costs and better-funded services, cooperation is grounded in the bread-and-butter concerns that are currently all-consuming.
4.1.3 No Red Lines Crossed: Starmer’s EU deal means boost to British businesses
Prime Minister hails a “historic” deal as unlocking more growth, more jobs, higher wages and trade with our neighbours.
The third strongest message - “No red lines crossed” - frames a new EU deal as consistent with the principles set out during the Brexit vote, restoring support for a deal by almost four points. It emphasises that a new relationship can be forged without costing perceived democratic integrity and respect for the outcome of the referendum. This allows skeptical voters to entertain a closer relationship without feeling Brexit would be undermined.
Section 5
Recommendations
To counter Eurosceptic attacks, the pragmatic, tangible security and economic benefits of closer ties with the EU must be emphasised. Clear and effective messaging should respect the referendum result, and mitigate concerns around immigration and sovereignty.
Implement a capped UK-EU Youth Mobility Scheme
5.1
Support for a new UK-EU agreement is closely tied to whether migration is seen as controlled, selective and contributory. Proposals that lack caps or safeguards quickly trigger scepticism. Those that include limits, conditions and clear benefits to the UK economy achieve broader approval. A Youth Mobility Scheme can thread this needle. It offers a clear economic upside (our modelling shows a potential £1bn annual fiscal benefit) and the migration involved is considered by the public as intrinsically temporary and mutual.
It is important to recognise that “cultural exchange and tourism” is one of the least compelling reasons for a closer relationship with the EU. It is therefore vital to frame a Youth Mobility Scheme as a mutually beneficial, economic partnership that will create opportunities for our young people and boost our economy without draining our public services.
We propose a scheme with:
Capped participation to alleviate public concerns around legal migration levels.
No access to public funds, addressing a key public "red line" from EU deal negotiations and reducing perceived burdens on services.
A cost-of-living surcharge and a healthcare surcharge to counter concerns around non-contributory migration. This could be used to fund cost-of-living measures such as the Household Support Fund. [1]
A maximum duration of three years.
Optional: access to home tuition fees if students were included in the scheme - a key ask of the European Union in negotiations.
Example Scenarios
100,000 cap (students excluded). Conservative deadweight for workers.
Annual fiscal benefit (not including application fee): £1.03bn
Total fiscal benefit over 3-year scheme (including application fee): £3.12bn
100,000 cap (students included & access to home tuition fees) + 20,000 increase in student numbers. Conservative deadweight for workers & realistic deadweight for students.
Annual fiscal benefit (not including application fee): £425 million
Total fiscal benefit over 3-year scheme (including application fee): £1.29 billion
*Please see the appendix for additional scenarios and a detailed explanation of assumptions.
[1] While a tailored surcharge policy for EU migrants might be politically attractive in the UK, it may be rejected by the Commission if it treats EU nationals less favourably than other third-country migrants. An alternative solution could be a general increase in surcharges for all visa holders.
Unify Carbon and Electricity Markets to Bring Down Cost-of-Living and Increase Security
5.2
The UK and EU share interconnected energy systems, but Brexit has introduced inefficiencies in electricity trading, carbon pricing and carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs). Aligning these systems will bolster energy security to protect the UK from price shocks and reduce the cost of living - a key priority for the British public in negotiations with the EU. [2] Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine directly responsible for price increases. Connecting our carbon and energy markets is a perfect example of enhancing national security through protecting living standards and improving resilience.
Key Proposals
Link UK and EU Carbon Markets via the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): Aligning the UK ETS with the EU ETS will reduce volatility, support renewable energy rollout and align with the EU CBAM, easing export burdens. This could raise £700m-£1.6bn annually (£3.5bn-£8bn over the 2025-30 Parliament) for the Treasury through increased tax revenues.
Join the EU Electricity Market: Adopt a more ambitious trading arrangement with regulatory alignment, supported by independent arbitration. This could save £120m-£370m annually by eliminating trading inefficiencies.
Revenue hypothecation options for a connected carbon market
The additional revenue from a linked UK-EU carbon market of £700m-£1.6bn annually can be used to support households and address cost-of-living concerns.
Option 1: Reduce bills for all households
Distribute £700m-£1.6bn annually across all 28.4 million households, reducing bills by £25-£56 per year. [3]
Option 2: Increase payments for the Warm Homes Discount
The Government currently has plans to extend eligibility for the Warm Homes Discount for winter 2025/26, allowing 6.1 million households to claim the £150 rebate. [4] We propose allocating the £700m-£1.6bn of additional revenue to increase payments for the Warm Homes Discount by £115-£262 per household (in addition to the £150 for which they are already eligible). [5]
[2] The dominant demand from the British public and key voting blocs for a deal with the EU is that it lowers energy (52%), food prices (48%) and the cost of goods and services (45%).
[3] Calculated by dividing the revenue from linked UK-EU carbon markets of £700m-1.6bn annually by 28.4m.
[4] The eligibility criteria currently requires households to be in receipt of means-tested benefits and have ‘high energy costs’. The new criteria would remove the requirement on ‘high energy costs’, making all households in receipt of means-tested benefits eligible.
[5] This would bring total payments to £265-£412. The average fuel poverty gap (the amount needed to lift households out of fuel poverty) is estimated at £407.
Avoid European Court of Justice Jurisdiction
5.3
Direct European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction over the UK fuels public and political concerns about loss of control. [6] However, the ECJ’s role in overseeing EU law is a non-negotiable EU principle when third countries adopt EU regulations, as seen in the Northern Ireland Protocol and the Windsor Framework. To address this, we propose a dispute resolution model that balances EU requirements with UK sovereignty, drawing on precedents like the EU-Switzerland agreement (December 2024) and the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement (2020).
This model avoids ECJ oversight of the UK’s compliance and offers a politically acceptable alternative, demonstrating improved sovereignty compared to arrangements negotiated by previous governments. It also supports proposed areas of cooperation, e.g. a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement and carbon market alignment, by providing a stable legal framework, reducing trade frictions and enhancing economic benefits.
Key Proposals
Independent Arbitration Panel: Disputes arising from UK-EU agreements (e.g. SPS standards, energy market alignment, or defence cooperation) should be resolved by an independent arbitration panel, ensuring no direct ECJ jurisdiction over the UK.
Limited ECJ Role via Reference Procedure: Where disputes involve interpreting EU law (e.g. EU standards adopted in a SPS agreement), the panel may refer specific questions to the ECJ. The ECJ’s opinion on EU law interpretation would be binding, but the arbitration panel retains authority over the overall dispute outcome and any remedies.
[6] ECJ oversight is a red line with the British public: 31% of respondents reject it as part of a UK-EU deal. This was broadly reflected among Labour voters overall (29%) and 28% of Labour-Reform Switchers. There is also a risk we found in focus groups that the ECJ is muddled into political commentary about the ECHR.
Establish a UK-EU Defence and Security Pact with SAFE Fund Access
5.4
The UK faces critical defence challenges, including artillery shortages, depleted air defence (AD) stocks and vulnerabilities to unmanned aerial systems (UAS), which has worsened due to Ukraine donations and evolving warfare. We recommend leveraging the public’s appetite for “good relationships with good people” to secure a formal pact with the EU,[7] enabling UK participation in the SAFE fund (€150bn, 2025–2035) to enhance capabilities, reduce costs and support joint procurement and R&D in key areas. This builds on one of the most resonant themes identified in our research: strong public support for cooperation with the EU to deliver tangible security benefits.
Key Proposals
Formal Defence Pact: Negotiate a UK-EU agreement to coordinate on shared threats, including Russian aggression, and bolster support for Ukraine. The pact would enable joint exercises, intelligence sharing and capability development, building on existing UK-EU security ties (e.g., via NATO and bilateral frameworks).
Access to SAFE Fund: Secure UK participation as a third country in SAFE-funded projects, allowing for cost savings on areas such as artillery production, Counter-UAS (C-UAS) and Air Defence (AD/AA).
Avoid ECJ jurisdiction: Govern defence cooperation (e.g. SAFE participation) with the proposed independent arbitration mechanism (see Recommendation 3), ensuring no direct European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction and addressing public concerns about sovereignty.
[7] “Good relationships with good people” is one of the most compelling framings for cooperation with the EU. This framing had support from 86% of Labour Leave voters, 89% of Labour-Reform Switchers and 87% of Labour 24 voters. 79% of Britons overall support the framing.
Appendix
Detailed methodology
Supplementary Charts from Qualitative Research
Below are a series of charts and commentary, detailing additional materials from the survey element of our report. This is intended to be a helpful aid and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the results from our research.
Chart A. A word cloud from all respondents in our survey, showing descriptions of Donald Trump. Filler words are removed.
Chart B. A word cloud from all respondents in our survey, showing descriptions of Nigel Farage. Filler words are removed.
Chart C. ‘Red lines’ selected by all Britons in context of a negotiation with the EU. Only top 4 ‘red lines’ are shown here.
Chart D. Responses across all Britons and select crossbreaks by voting intention and 2024 General election vote on relations with the EU.
Chart E. Responses from all Britons on supporting or opposing policy changes with the EU.
Chart F. Responses from all Britons and select crossbreaks by voting intention and 2024 General election vote on threats to UK national interests.
Youth Mobility
Additional Scenarios
Additional Scenario 1: 50,000 cap with conservative deadweight for workers (students excluded)
Assumes a migration deadweight of 23,400.*
Assumes per participant fiscal benefit of £11,400 per year (£34,200 over the 3-year scheme).**
Application fee and surcharges***
One-off application fee of £319 per participant
Healthcare surcharge: £776 per participant per year (£2,328 over the 3-year scheme)
Cost-of-living surcharge: £1,000 per participant per year (£3,000 over the 3-year scheme)
Fiscal Benefits:
Headroom: £303m per year. Over 3 years: £910m
Application fee: £8.5m (one-off)
Healthcare surcharge: £21m per year. Over 3 years: £62m
Cost-of-living surcharge: £50m per year. Over 3 years: £150m
Annual fiscal benefit (not including application fee) : £374 million
Total fiscal benefit over 3-year scheme (including application fee) : £1.13 billion
Additional Scenario 2: 100,000 cap (students included & access to home tuition fees)
Conservative deadweight for workers & realistic deadweight for students
If the scheme includes students and access to home tuition fees, we recommend the cap is set no lower than 100,000. It quickly results in a fiscal loss below a cap of 100,000.
Assumes a conservative migration deadweight of workers at 23,400, with an additional realistic deadweight of 20,600 for students.*
Assumes net migration impact deadweight of 44k (combined work and student entrants), due to students having access to home tuition fees. This is removed from the youth mobility cap
Assumes per participant fiscal benefit of £11,400 per year (£34,200 over the 3-year scheme).**
Application fee and surcharges***
One-off application fee of £319 per participant
Healthcare surcharge: £776 per participant per year (£2,328 over the 3-year scheme)
Cost-of-living surcharge: £1,000 per participant per year (£3,000 over the 3-year scheme)
Cost of home tuition fees: -£8765 per participant per year****
Fiscal impacts:
Headroom benefit: £638m per year. Over 3 years: £1.91bn
Application fee: £17.9m per year (one-off)
Healthcare surcharge: £43m per year. Over 3 years: £129m
Cost-of-living surcharge: £100m per year. Over 3 years: £300m
Home tuition fees: -£181m per year. Over 3 years: -£542m
Annual fiscal benefits (not including application fee): £618 million
Total fiscal benefits over 3-year scheme (including application fee): £1.81 billion
Additional Scenario 3: 100,000 cap, optimistic deadweight, students excluded
Assumes an optimistic migration deadweight of 5,000 due to limited competition between visas.*
Assumes per participant fiscal benefit of £11,400 per year (£34,200 over the 3-year scheme).**
Application fee and surcharges✝
One-off application fee of £319 per participant
Healthcare surcharge: £776 per participant per year (£2,328 over the 3-year scheme)
Cost-of-living surcharge: £1,000 per participant per year (£3,000 over the 3-year scheme)
Fiscal Benefits:
Headroom benefit: £1.08bn per year. Over 3 years: £3.25bn
Application fee: £30m per year (one-off)
Healthcare surcharge: £74m per year. Over 3 years: £221m
Cost-of-living surcharge: £100m per year. Over 3 years: £300m
Annual fiscal benefits (not including application fee): £1.25 billion
Total fiscal benefits over 3-year scheme (including application fee): £3.80 billion
Assumptions and Recommendations
Capped participation
We have recommended that the number of visas issued under the scheme each year be capped to alleviate public anxiety around the amount of legal immigration into the UK.
Duration
Our modelling is based on a scheme duration of 3 years, in order to achieve reasonable fiscal benefits. We have modelled the fiscal benefit per year, which illustrates the benefit of the scheme if it were only to last for 1 year, not including visa fees.
Public services
We recommend that access to public funds is restricted for participants, as this was one of the public’s top red lines in relation to a new deal with the EU.
Age range
Based on our polling, we recommend an age range of 18-30.
*Deadweight
We have assumed a portion of ‘deadweight’ in each scenario, where the youth mobility scheme takes away participants from other points of entry into the UK from the EU, reducing the fiscal benefit of the youth mobility scheme and reducing the number of net migrants.
In 2023, 23,400 work visas (excluding dependents) were granted to EU citizens in 2023. We have therefore assumed a conservative deadweight of 23,400 for scenarios excluding students from the scheme. In reality, not all of the EU citizens on work visas would be aged between 18 to 30 and some would voluntarily choose the work visa route over the youth mobility route, as it is less expensive. We therefore expect this is an overestimate.
In scenarios where the scheme is open to students and EU citizens are also given access to home tuition fees, we assume that all 20,600 European applicants that were granted student visas in 2023 would instead utilise the youth mobility scheme to access significantly cheaper tuition fees. Combined with the 23,400 conservative assumption on work visas, this amounts to a deadweight impact of 44,000.
**Fiscal benefits
The fiscal benefits from a youth mobility scheme is based on net migration. Box 4.5 of the OBR's March 2024 EFO sets out the fiscal impact of a variety of immigration scenarios. In a scenario where net migration is 200,000 higher than their forecast they estimate extra tax receipts worth £17.5bn in the final year. They also assume that the government responds to this increase by increasing public spending by £6.1bn in that year. The total net fiscal benefit in this scenario is that borrowing is reduced by £11.4bn. We have excluded the lower debt interest costs in this OBR scenario to produce a conservative assumption. £11.4bn from 200,000 additional net migration means each additional migrant is worth £57,000 in fiscal benefit over the forecast period of 5 years; £34,200 over a 3-year period we have proposed in our scheme.
***Application fee and surcharges:
This scheme will apply the same application fee and health surcharge as existing youth mobility schemes into the UK - as with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea. The Immigration Healthcare Surcharge (IHS) is £776 annually, and the application fee is £319 one-off.
We have also recommended an additional “cost-of-living surcharge” of £1,000 per person. The revenue raised from this surcharge would go towards alleviating the cost-of-living crisis, for example by funding the Household Support Fund and/or Warm Homes Discount. This address public anxiety around the potential additional costs of immigration while also offering a solution to the cost-of-living crisis, which is the public’s top concern.
We have assumed that the application fee and the IHS are already paid by the deadweight number in each scenario, and therefore that portion is removed from the fiscal benefits calculation. The cost-of-living surcharge is a new fee and therefore we have applied it to the total number of participants in the scheme, including those that are in the deadweight.
****The cost of home tuition fees:
In the two scenarios in which students can use the scheme, we have modelled the fiscal impact of granting EU citizens access to home tuition fees. We have factored in this cost because tuition fees are incorporated into OBR public finance assessments, and granting home tuition fees will result in lost revenue.
The lost income is an approximate estimate given international fees vary widely depending on the course, level of qualification and awarding institution. This was estimated between £10,000-£20,000 in 2021/22, or £12,199-£24,399 today, adjusted for inflation. For this model we have taken the median of the estimate, and assumed that international fees are £18,300 per student. Granting home tuition fees means EU students in our scenario will pay £9,535 instead of £18,300, representing a loss of £8,765 in revenue per student.
With special thanks to…
Louisa Dollimore
Arthur Fyfe-Stoica
Photography by Jez Coulson
Theresa Bischof
Chris Clarke
Billie Coulson