May 2026
Bringing Defence Home
Rewiring defence to power growth, sovereignty and security
“[We have an] increasingly volatile world … [at] home and abroad … [we] can't take for granted that America will carry on paying lots more and come to our defence when we're not paying our way.”
- Man, Labour-Left Switcher, New Forest East
Foreword
Alex Baker MP
Defence Select Committee
The threats facing the United Kingdom today are ever-evolving, and so too must our understanding of what it means to defend ourselves. National security is no longer determined solely by the size of our armed forces or the strength of our alliances. It is increasingly shaped by the resilience of our economy, the capability off our workforce and the robustness of the systems we depend upon every day.
Hostile actors and states don’t need to cross borders to cause damage. They can target our infrastructure, our supply chains and our digital networks. In doing so, they undermine the institutions that sustain daily life, from public services to local employers, and expose vulnerabilities that cannot be addressed through conventional military means alone.
This makes investment in defence not only a matter of security, but of shared prosperity and renewal. Modern defence policy must strengthen the nation from the ground up - creating opportunity, building resilience, and restoring confidence in communities that feel left behind. When defence spending supports the skills, industries and infrastructure that underpin everyday life, its value becomes clear not only in times of crisis but in the stability and pride it fosters across the country. By bringing defence home, Britain can build both a stronger economy and a stronger sense of collective purpose.
This report recognises that national resilience, sovereign capability and national defence are closely linked. Through supporting British workers, businesses and communities, we can enhance our ability to protect critical infrastructure, maintain continuity in times of crisis and operate with confidence in an increasingly uncertain world. At the same time, we can demonstrate to Britons how defence can also work for them in their day-to-day lives.
Security and prosperity are not at odds with each other. Britain cannot project strength abroad while hollowing itself out at home. We can build a country that is visibly, tangibly stronger because of how we choose to defend it.
“We want to feel safe where we live, don’t we? We want to feel safe in our country.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Nuneaton
Executive Summary
America’s escalation with Iran has sent shockwaves through the global economy, driving up oil prices, increasing instability across the Middle East and forcing Britain to confront a world in which even our closest ally can trigger crises that hit households, public services and employers at home. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has returned large‑scale warfare to Europe, while a constant drumbeat of cyberattacks are hitting our hospitals, businesses and critical infrastructure. The confrontation between hostile states and Britain has already begun, and the disruptions we experience today are not isolated incidents but opening moves in a wider struggle.
Britain has always seen itself as a country that stands up when it matters. A nation that finds shared purpose under pressure and refuses to back down. From the historical significance of D‑Day and VE Day to the pop‑culture phenomenon of “Keep Calm and Carry On”, our national story is one of collective courage and institutions that hold when tested. While there is plenty of nostalgia to it, the memory speaks to what Britain is capable of when called upon, and what it must now find again in a world where our energy supplies, hospitals, councils, local employers and critical networks can be targeted or destabilised without a shot being fired.
Yet, the political conditions required to meet this moment are fragile. Defence and national security rank among the top concerns for only 10% of voters. The economy, immigration and the NHS dominate. People support increased spending because they see defence as a basic duty of government, but they do not instinctively connect it to the pressures they face in daily life. Put defence in a direct fight against spending “at home” (as voters understand defence to be abroad) and it will lose.
This creates a strategic vulnerability. As long as defence is seen to compete with the NHS, housing and energy bills, the public consent required to prepare Britain for the threats it faces will remain shallow. But, despite that hesitancy, the public is already beginning to recognise the symptoms of a changed world: three‑quarters of Britons say they are worried about cyberattacks on public services, and nearly half say they are more concerned about national security than they were a decade ago. People sense that something has shifted – that Britain feels less able to produce, maintain and defend the systems that keep it running – but they have not yet been given the story that connects that instinct to action on defence.
This report provides that story. Defence investment is a means of protecting the things people care about, not in conflict with them, and cyber is where that protection is most visible at home. Cyber resilience protects our economy and essential public services; sovereign capability protects our supply chains from shocks; investment in skills, technology and digital infrastructure strengthens both our armed forces and our jobs. Security and prosperity must be seen as one and the same - online and offline, abroad and at home. Defence policy built on that foundation can command the sustained public support that Britain's security now requires.
The policies we recommend set out a framework to make defence spending politically durable by strengthening the country's workforce and skills base, supporting local economies and employers, protecting essential the public from both physical and digital disruption and reinforcing Britain’s capacity to produce and secure its own defence capabilities. In short, it shows how to bring defence home so that every pound spent on security also visibly strengthens life in Britain, even as instability sends new shocks through the world.
The Playbook to Bring Defence Home
The policies we set out are not traditional within defence. They are policies that speak to the sovereign capability of the country - to skills, housing and local economies. And crucially, they are understood to matter in the present. People back investment when they can see it working for them. When spending visibly improves lives, creates opportunity and strengthens communities, it stops being a burden on the public finances and starts being understood as a contribution to them. Defence is no exception.
Creating Pathways: Defence First
For many young people, defence is invisible as a career path - despite it being one of Britain’s most significant industrial employers supporting over 460,000 jobs across the UK. Using the model of the new Armed Forces Foundation Year, the Ministry of Defence should establish a Defence First Scheme: a paid foundation year opening up routes into the defence sector. Targeting young people who are not in education, employment or training (NEETs), it prioritises lower-income candidates through contextual recruitment and a living wage stipend.
Fighting Back: Cyber Crime Resilience Fund
Cyber attacks on our hospitals, businesses and public services are a frontline that many people already experience - and the one area where defence has an opportunity to be visibly, tangibly at home. Yet most people and small businesses have no idea where to turn to when they are hit.
A new National Cybercrime and Fraud Hotline: victims call once, get logged nationally, and connected to local specialists. This would be branded by the MoD and supported by the Home Office.
Strengthen the existing Regional Cyber Resilience Centres across England and Wales, on secure multi-year funding, expanding support to individuals, small businesses and local institutions.
Trained cyber leads embedded in local policing teams, bringing protection to the places and people most at risk.
Restoring Communities: Repurposing Ministry of Defence Land
Surplus MoD land sits unused in communities across the country - a huge public asset with the potential to deliver homes, jobs and regeneration. To translate that opportunity into delivery, we propose two new mechanisms: dedicated MoD Land Development Corporations with planning and compulsory purchase powers, and a new class of National Development Management Policies - "Ministry Zones" - creating a statutory presumption in favour of development on former military sites, cutting through planning delays.
Backing British: Supporting SMEs with the Backing British Package
Defence contracts too often flow to a small number of large primes, bypassing the small businesses that are the heart of the British economy. A new national Defence Bank would provide government-backed finance to help British SMEs scale and compete, supported by a new Behaviour Scorecard holding prime contractors accountable for how they treat smaller firms, and a simplified procurement portal so defence contracts are genuinely open to all.
Giving Back: Offsetting via the Sovereign Capability Regime
When foreign companies win major Ministry contracts, Britain should see the economic returns. A new binding offset regime would require international suppliers winning contracts over £20 million to reinvest 50% of the contract's value back into the UK economy - supporting British businesses, creating skilled jobs and strengthening sovereign industrial capability.
Public Attitudes Methodology
This report is based on:
2x national representative online polls.
GGF Insights conducted a poll of 2,070 British adults online between the 28th of November and the 1st of December 2025. Figures were weighted to be both nationally and politically representative of all Britons, based on age, gender, education level, region, vote in 2019, vote in 2024, and political attention.
GGF Insights conducted a poll of 2,000 British adults online between the 13th and 16th of February 2026. Figures were weighted to be both nationally and politically representative of all Britons, based on age, gender, education level, region, vote in 2019, vote in 2024, and political attention.
2x focus groups conducted by The Good Growth Foundation on 20th November 2025.
1x group with Labour-Left Switchers: 2024 Labour Party voters who say they will vote for either The Liberal Democrat Party or The Green Party at the next general election.
1x group with Labour-Reform Switchers: 2024 Labour Party voters who say they will vote for Reform UK at the next general election.
Part 1
British Pride, Capability and Industry
A Nation That’s Lost Its Edge
1.1
“I think we’d struggle to beat Lichtenstein in a fight on our own now.”
- Man, Labour-Left Switcher, New Forest East
When voters think about defence, they are rarely thinking about war. They are thinking about the country as a whole - our strength, our security and whether we still feel capable. People do not fear invasion or an imminent military conflict. They fear that we as a country are weaker than we used to be. Less industrially strong. Less economically secure. Less able to act with confidence in a world that feels increasingly unstable. In this way, defence becomes a core part of a larger question: whether Britain still has the resilience to stand on its own.
Nearly half (46%) of the public say they are more worried about Britain’s defence and security than they were ten years ago. It is a concern that cuts across political divides and adds to the pessimism felt by many about the standing of their country. It is generally perceived that only the political right cares about our military might and takes patriotic pride in our armed forces. But, repeatedly in our focus groups, we heard dismay that Britain has been diminished from all sides. One Labour-Left Switcher bluntly told us they think the country is “weak”, a Labour-Reform Switcher argued “the UK itself is in a mess.” Concern about the country’s defence is not limited to one political view and overall opinion is remarkably similar to how people imagine our economy: fragile.
“I don’t think [the military is] fit for purpose. It gets talked about, but I think if something happened and it was put to the test, I think we’d be sadly lacking.”
- Man, Labour-Left Switcher, New Forest East
“I think the world is a completely changing landscape … especially with the current American administration. I don’t think we can rely on the States like we used to … NATO is in a state of flux. I think we cannot underestimate the threat of Putin … I think we need to be ready for, you know, God forbid, the inevitable.”
- Woman, Labour-Left Switcher, Romford
The link between defence and the economy is not a quirk of the public consciousness; it can be understood as part of the broader concern that the country has lost the sovereign capability and institutional confidence that once made it a top player on the world stage. Voters doubt the UK’s ability to act decisively and defend itself from malign forces in all forms. But, when defence is put in a straight fight with visible pressures “at home”, it loses. And this will remain the case unless people can see how defence spending helps to fix what feels broken in their lives.
Nearly half (46%) of Britons believe the Government should increase spending on defence, compared to just 16% who say it should spend less. Yet only 10% of voters rank defence and national security among the top three most important issues facing the country - far behind the economy and cost-of-living (63%), immigration and asylum (52%) and health and the NHS (45%). People are worried enough to back higher spending, but not enough to put defence ahead of the pressures they feel every day.
It is not surprising that voters are much more focused on the cost-of-living crisis and public services than on defence. Struggling with bills, waiting lists and stretched local services, it is natural they see those as the first things that need attention. Yet, the issues are not discrete. The sense that Britain is failing - and that this failure is making us weaker - bleeds across from the economy to defence and back again.
When focus group participants spoke about national security, they often did so in the same breath as concerns about productivity, public services or the country’s ability to compete economically. For many, “security” is inseparable from whether the UK still had the means to produce, build and maintain the systems that keep it running in moments of crisis. Safety and security are not simply about the armed forces, but about whether Britain retains the institutional competence and productive strength required to withstand disruption, whether from foreign military aggression or a domestic cyberattack.
This concern is sharpened by the geopolitical context voters see unfolding around them. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has returned territorial warfare to Europe, while cyberattacks are already disrupting hospitals, businesses and infrastructure in the UK. At the same time, the reliability of the United States as a long‑term partner is increasingly questioned, not least because of its recent military action against Iran and the resulting spikes in oil prices and wider economic uncertainty. Public concern reflects this pressure. While 26% of Britons say they are most worried about threats to national security from outside the UK and 13% about threats from within, nearly half (49%) say they are equally concerned about both. People are not simply worried about adversaries abroad. They are worried about Britain’s preparedness at home.
That anxiety is mirrored in perceptions of the UK’s global standing. Most respondents describe Britain as playing only a “moderate role” in world affairs, with few believing the country plays a “major role” in areas such as global conflict, diplomacy or the international economy. Yet, there is a clear appetite for Britain to do more, particularly in shaping the global economy and leading in science, technology and innovation. In this context, defence spending functions as a signal. It reassures voters that Britain is taking its own security seriously and that it retains the capacity to protect itself and its allies when necessary.
Support for greater investment in munitions production stands at 45%, rising to 59% among Labour-Reform switchers and 49% among Labour-Left switchers. Yet 58% of the public do not believe such an investment would impact their day-to-day lives. Only 26% think it would. This gap between support and perceived relevance highlights the political challenge facing policymakers. Defence investment may be welcomed as evidence that Britain is acting with seriousness in a more precarious world, but it will struggle to command sustained backing unless it is understood to strengthen the country’s economic and institutional resilience as well as have a tangible impact on people’s lives.
Focus group participants frequently asked what defence spending would mean for them - for their communities, their businesses, their public services. Others expressed concern that Britain had isolated itself from the alliances that once underpinned its security. Taken together, these responses suggest that public support for defence spending is contingent on whether it contributes to strengthening the homefront - helping to rebuild the skills, infrastructure and technological capacity required to operate in a more competitive and volatile context. In a world shaped by Russia’s aggression, cyber threats to public services and uncertainty in Washington, defence policy is becoming a test of national confidence.
“National security is the coal and oil industry, the banking industry… because if they lose that, then they've got nothing, have they?”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Wakefield & Rothwell
“As part of Europe, we're a massive country… a massive thing, but we've [taken] ourselves away from that. We're minute in the world”
- Man, Labour-Left Switcher, Tipton & Wednesbury
‘They can’t defend their own borders - I don’t know what the Navy are for.”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Wakefield & Rothwell
[1] HM Treasury, ‘Office for Budget Responsibility and HM Treasury Framework Document’, April 2011
[2] Cabinet Office, ‘Cabinet Office Guidance: pre-appointment scrutiny by House of Commons select committees’, January 2019
[3] Matthew Keep, House of Commons Library, ‘Office For Budget Responsibility’, Pg 19, March 2026
Bring it Home
1.2
The Playbook
Defence First: Using the model of the new Armed Forces Foundation Year, the Ministry of Defence should establish a Defence First Scheme: a paid foundation year opening up routes into the defence sector. Targeting young people who are not in education, employment or training (NEETs), it prioritises lower-income candidates through contextual recruitment and a living wage stipend.
Repurposing MoD Land: Britain has surplus defence land sitting unused in communities across the country. Building on the MoD's existing Housing Strategy, we propose accelerating redevelopment through new MoD Land Development Corporations and dedicated planning frameworks including dedicated NDMPs on a statutory footing. Currently, NDMP utilisation is embedded in the Strategy, but we propose strengthening this with a statutory mechanism. Former military sites become catalysts for affordable housing, local employment and community regeneration, making defence investment visible in the places that need it most.
Public concern about defence may be rooted in a wider anxiety about the UK’s weakening position in the world, but that doesn’t necessarily mean defence automatically matters to voters. Because, while support for strengthening national security exists, its relevance does not.
When we asked voters whether increased defence spending would improve their day-to-day lives, they were split. 41% believe it would, while 46% believe it wouldn’t. The public is open to doing more, but unconvinced that this will make any difference to them at home.
“When you’re sitting in the pub, having a drink, you know, £4.50, £5, and getting fleeced, you talk about … the economy, you talk about housing, government. Defence doesn't ever come into a conversation with any of my friends.”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Rochdale
“I think when you're walking around Tesco's, and you can't afford things, and when your bill comes through for your electric, and you're struggling - I don't think you care about defence. I think that's the last on anyone's list.”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Wakefield & Rothwell
For many, defence still feels like something that happens elsewhere - Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iraq. One Labour-Reform Switcher told us: “The army tends to be in other countries … As far as … defending our country, not since, probably, World War II.”
Our foundational report, ‘Mind the Growth Gap’, outlined how economic growth is seen as distant to everyday life - defence also falls into this trap. People support increased spending because they understand it to be a vital function of the state, not because it really has anything to do with them. In a cost-of-living crisis, that disconnect could come back to bite. Spending that cannot be linked to tangible benefits here at home risks being viewed as a trade-off with more immediate priorities. This tension surfaced frequently in focus groups, where participants questioned why resources were being directed “overseas” (as is their view of defence spending) rather than towards issues at home.
“We've always had this kind of input into other parts of the world, and you sometimes question …,why are we doing this? [...] We're probably spending a hell of a lot on defense, [..] I think there's certainly money that could be taken out of that budget and used back at home for other things.”
- Man, Labour-Left Switcher, Tipton & Wednesbury
Frequently, defence spending is perceived as existing in competition with the NHS, housing or energy bills. In the absence of a visible domestic dividend, it becomes abstract or discretionary. While it may be seen as a necessary expense, it is an expense nonetheless and one that can easily be condemned for not being used to support the public.
Yet this disconnect is not inevitable. When defence is framed - and genuinely delivered - as part of a broader national effort to strengthen the country’s workforce, infrastructure and people, attitudes begin to shift. Support for regenerating defence land to build new communities stands at 46%, rising to 62% among Labour‑Left Switchers. More than half (52%) would support a major defence skills package, with support rising to 58% among Labour‑Reform Switchers. People back spending when they see it working for them - and defence is no exception.
The policies that follow are designed to do exactly that: to make defence spending legible as a productive investment in British communities, rather than a black box governments appear to throw endless cash into. Across both Labour-Left and Labour-Reform switchers, defence spending is politically persuasive when it is understood as rebuilding domestic capacity and protecting everyday lives. As one Labour-Reform switcher put it: "Upskilling people, giving opportunities for school leavers, that's what we need."
Security begins at home. It rests on whether the country retains the skills, infrastructure and competence needed to respond when crises occur - and continues to strengthen the economy when they do not. Appeals to global instability alone will not sustain public support. Defence must be seen to reinforce Britain's economic strength and institutional resilience in tangible terms.
Defence First
Consistently in our research, we find skills and training to be one of the most tangible ways voters experience growth (Take Back Control). Good for the economy and good for people, skills and training offer a pathway for people to get ahead. That is why we propose creating the Defence First scheme, which would build on the current pilot of the Armed Forces Foundation Year into a full, nationwide foundation year programme for 18-24 year olds entering the defence sector and adjacent industries.
It is intended to provide an entry route for individuals aged 18–24, particularly those not in education, employment, or training (NEET), with eligibility criteria broad enough to include those with few or no qualifications. Contextual recruitment would be baked in from the outset, prioritising candidates from lower-income backgrounds, in line with the Strategic Defence Review's emphasis on improving outreach to young people. In practice, this means offering an intensive, high‑readiness training year, supported by a living‑wage style stipend so that financial barriers do not prevent participation. Delivery would be embedded in the local institutions people already know – Further Education colleges, regional training hubs, job centres and schools – and would make use of MoD equipment and site‑based learning to bring defence visibly into communities across the country. The curriculum would focus in particular on fast‑track, transferable technical skills, with pathways in cyber operations, systems engineering and advanced logistics that lead into entry‑level roles, apprenticeships or wider defence‑industry careers. Participants would not be required to continue their career within the defence industry, but it would demonstrate that the industry is able to give them valuable transferable skills and opportunities.
Crucially, Defence First is structured to address a core political vulnerability identified in our research: the perception that defence spending benefits distant institutions rather than local people. By linking the scheme to a Behaviour Scorecard for major contractors, the MoD can incentivise Primes and other adjacent companies to recruit Defence First alumni, offer guaranteed interviews and create clear progression routes, so that public investment in defence training is visibly rewarded with good jobs in British firms. In doing so, Defence First makes defence spending legible as an investment in the domestic workforce and sovereign capability – strengthening national security by strengthening the skills, confidence and earning power of young people at home.
In Detail: Defence First
To bridge the widening gap between the military ecosystem and the domestic workforce, the Ministry of Defence should establish a Defence First scheme - a full foundation year for school leavers to enter the defence sector. This builds on the existing Armed Forces Foundation Year pilot, as well as being in line with the Strategic Defence Review, which also referenced the need for outreach to young people.
This scaled-up scheme is intended, initially, to provide an on-ramp into training and work for NEET individuals between 18 and 24, transforming the existing pilot into one intensive, high-readiness foundation year with a criterion that is liberal enough to allow for those with few or no qualifications. Contextual recruitment should be baked into the scheme to ensure lower-income individuals are prioritised. The policy would aim to provide a clear route into the sector for under-25s.
Central to the operational success of the Foundation is the provision of a living wage stipend, ensuring that financial instability does not compromise the recruitment of candidates from lower-income backgrounds. To achieve total national coverage, the Ministry should seek to embed this programme within local community infrastructure, specifically through collaboration with Further Education colleges and regional training hubs, with the use of MOD equipment and site days where applicable. The curriculum should prioritise the rapid acquisition of transferable, technical skills - with specialised tracks in cyber operations, systems engineering, and advanced logistics - to prepare participants for entry-level operational roles, apprenticeships and adjacent roles in the wider defence industry.
To maximise its impact, the scheme could be explicitly tied to our proposed MoD Behaviour Scorecard so that primes who recruit scheme graduates receive higher scores and a guaranteed apprenticeship pathway for the highest‑performing participants.
Consistent with the Strategic Defence Review's recommendation for the Department for Education to develop understanding of the Armed Forces among young people in schools, the Defence First scheme should be embedded within that broader educational outreach, providing a natural next step for those leaving education who wish to translate that awareness into a career in defence.
Repurposing Surplus MoD Land
Repurposing surplus MoD land can turn underused public assets into homes, infrastructure and local jobs, making defence spending visible in the places that need it most. Britain has surplus defence land in communities across the country; building on the MoD’s new Housing Strategy, this land can be rapidly converted into new housing and mixed‑use developments.
Using existing legislation and targeted reforms, surplus non‑operational MoD sites - often in strategically located areas. Former airfields, barracks and logistics sites would become catalysts for affordable housing, local employment and community regeneration, rather than decaying assets behind fences.
One route would be bespoke MoD Land Development Corporations, created under the Levelling Up and Regeneration Act to manage large surplus sites. These corporations would hold planning and compulsory purchase powers, oversee long‑term masterplans and ensure that developments meet clear requirements on affordability, Forces First housing and community amenities.
A second lever is a tailored set of National Development Management Policies - “Ministry Zones” - for surplus MoD land, placed on a distinct statutory footing. These zones would create a presumption in favour of sustainable development, accelerate planning decisions and give national policy primacy over local plans where the land is previously developed military infrastructure, including in parts of the Green Belt.
To guarantee local benefit, redevelopment on former MoD sites not reserved for Forces First homes would carry Section 106 agreements with minimum affordable‑housing thresholds and exemptions from viability arguments that normally dilute these commitments. Environmental Outcomes Reports would be streamlined but robust, addressing historic contamination while keeping delivery on track.
By visibly transforming surplus defence land into new neighbourhoods, transport links and community facilities, this programme shows that resilience is about stronger communities and local capacity as much as it is about military hardware. It makes clear that defence investment is rebuilding Britain’s housing supply, regenerating local economies and supporting everyday life - not just funding activity overseas.
In Detail: Repurposing Surplus MoD Land
The Ministry’s Housing Strategy already outlines financing mechanisms, identifies available land, and presents next steps for redeveloping some surplus MOD land for housing and infrastructure, including the establishment of a Defence Housing Service to oversee delivery. The recommendations in this briefing are designed to complement this strategy and to accelerate the redevelopment of units beyond those reserved for Forces First. Their implementation could be overseen by the new Service.
Using existing legislation and targeted reforms, surplus non‑operational MoD land – often in strategically located parts of the country – can be rapidly converted for residential and mixed‑use purposes. Several mechanisms could be deployed, depending on departmental preferences.
MoD Land Development Corporations
The Levelling Up and Regeneration Act has made it easier to establish locally led Urban Development Corporations, as seen recently in the Ox–Cam corridor. A new class of corporation could be created specifically to manage large surplus MoD sites, subject to appropriate size and impact criteria.
These bodies would have planning and compulsory purchase powers, making them well-suited to oversee the long‑term renewal of extensive disused sites such as airfields and barracks, where a master‑planned, multi‑decade approach is required. Their establishment could also ensure that the new housing stock meets important requirements, including affordability and Forces First housing.
Ministry NDMPs: new“Ministry Zones”
A tailored set of National Development Management Policies (NDMPs) could be applied to surplus MoD land, with these “Ministry Zones” placed on a statutory footing distinct from general NDMPs. The statutory footing would be unique to designated MoD land as identified by the Housing Strategy. This policy would aim to accelerate the conversion of military brownfield and Grey Belt sites - as identified by the Ministry - into high‑quality residential, commercial or mixed‑use developments that support national growth objectives.
To ensure local communities benefit directly, a portion of redevelopment on former MoD sites, that is not Forces First, should be subject to Section 106 agreements that guarantee a minimum proportion of affordable housing. These sites should be exempt from standard viability arguments used to dilute affordable housing commitments, on the basis that the land is already in public ownership.
An illustrative NDMP for surplus MoD land might establish a statutory presumption in favour of sustainable development, require accelerated planning decisions and give national policy primacy over local plans where sites comprise previously developed military infrastructure, including where this lies within existing Green Belt. It could also set minimum affordable housing thresholds and require streamlined Environmental Outcomes Reports to address historic contamination, ensuring that surplus defence assets become catalysts for regional regeneration and housing delivery.
[4] Committee of Public Accounts, ‘BBC Accounts and Trust Statement 2024-25’, Pg 1-2, November 2025
[5] BBC Group Report, ‘Efficiency and Transformation Review’, Pg 4, March 2026
[6] BBC Media Centre, The Impact of the BBC
[7] BBC News, ‘BBC iPlayer login will be required from 2017’, September 2016
[8] Sky News, ‘BBC set to use iPlayer to catch licence fee evaders’, January 2026
[9] Committee of Public Accounts, ‘BBC Accounts and Trust Statement 2024-25’, Pg 1-2, November 2025
[10] BBC Group Report, ‘Efficiency and Transformation Review’, Pg 4, March 2026
[11] Household Portal inspired by the Netflix household model, ‘What is a netflix household?’
[12] TechCrunch, ‘Netflix lists rules and exemptions to prevent account sharing’, February 2023
“[With] more people in jobs, there's less benefits paid out, and more tax receipts come in, as well as improving national security. So there's, you know, straight off, three benefits in that one sentence I've just said.”
- Man, Labour-Left Switcher, New Forest East
Who Really Benefits?
1.3
The Playbook
Backing British: To support the heart of the British economy, we recommend a new package of measures to support British SMEs in and adjacent to the defence industry, including simplifying procurement, a behaviour scorecard for prime contractors, with stronger requirements toward SME partners and improved access to finance through a new national Defence Bank.
The Sovereign Capability Regime: When international suppliers win major MoD contracts, that money should work for Britain. Under a new binding offset regime, foreign companies winning contracts above £20 million would be required to reinvest 50% of the contract's economic value back into the UK economy - supporting British businesses, creating skilled jobs and strengthening sovereign industrial capability.
One of the clearest tensions that emerged across our research was not simply whether Britain should spend more on defence, but where that money goes - and who it is ultimately for.
In principle, voters accept that defence is a core responsibility of the state. In practice, many are sceptical that increased spending would benefit people or places like theirs. Defence investment is often assumed to flow towards large multinational contractors or complex global supply chains, rather than into the small businesses and local economies that make up much of the UK’s employers.
“It's the big players that always seem to have the power to get their contracts, isn't it?”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Rochdale
“I start thinking of all the companies that are gonna get that money, and how they're related to the government. How it's all back-scratching, and they've been lobbied. [...] It's nothing to do with us, is it?”
- Man, Labour-Reform Switcher, Wakefield & Rothwell
This perception presents a significant political challenge. The problem is, if defence investment is understood to support only a narrow set of firms or interests, it risks being viewed as disconnected from the country’s wider economic needs. Particularly in communities that have already experienced industrial decline or feel investment has passed them by.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are where most people experience the economy. When defence investment fails to reach these firms, it hampers our ability to develop a domestic defence industry and sidelines the businesses voters want the Government to support.
In focus groups, Labour-Reform Switchers were particularly alert to this dynamic. While Labour-Left participants were slightly more sceptical of defence spending generally, Labour-Reform Switchers were much more concerned by who benefits from it. Neither group rejected defence spending outright, but it was frequently seen as serving the interests of large firms and distant institutions rather than British employers.
And voters are receptive to proposals that would move defence spending towards domestic capability. Nearly half (46%) of the public support ensuring small businesses receive a larger share of defence spending, with 41% support the creation of a Small Business Portal for defence contracts.
“We're gonna pay into it, and we're gonna see nothing of it.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Mid Derbyshire
“Demonstrates better value for money, doesn’t it?”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Nuneaton
These responses reflect a broader desire for defence investment to be distributed more evenly across the economy, particularly if it supports regional growth and creates pathways into skilled employment. Where spending is seen to support British firms and workers directly, it is more likely to be interpreted as part of a national effort to rebuild Britain.
In this framing, support for domestic firms becomes part of a broader programme to enhance our self-reliance. Rather than depending on complex international supply chains or a small number of dominant contractors, defence investment can be understood as strengthening Britain’s ability to produce what it needs. And this resonates with wider concerns about economic resilience. If national security depends on access to equipment, infrastructure or digital systems, then the country’s ability to design, manufacture and maintain those assets becomes a strategic question in its own right. And Labour-Reform Switchers are the most likely to believe ensuring SMEs receive a larger share of defence spending would impact their day-to-day lives.
Backing British Package for SMEs
The Backing British package is designed to rebalance the defence market so that SMEs across the UK can compete fairly, secure contracts and create good jobs in their communities. This would build on the current Defence Office for Small Business Growth which has begun the hard work of signalling more support for SMEs. Nearly 70% of defence jobs are already outside London and the South East, and empowering smaller firms in the supply chain is a direct route to spreading well‑paid, skilled employment across the North East, South West, East of England and the West Midlands.
Focus groups participants were resoundingly positive to the idea that smaller firms could play a greater role in national security. One Labour-Left Switcher said she was “very pleased” to see focus on SMEs, because “we are a nation of entrepreneurs.” While a Labour-Reform Switcher stressed the importance of competition, which would give “the little guy a shot.”
At its core sits a new Behaviour Scorecard for prime contractors, linking their treatment of SMEs directly to their ability to win future contracts. The scorecard would assess performance on SME engagement, payment practices and intellectual property terms, with updated definitions of late payment - including a standard 60‑day maximum - to stop large firms imposing 90-120 day terms that choke smaller suppliers’ cashflow. Because the Government already collects similar data as part of procurement reporting, integrating these metrics into a scorecard would simplify rather than complicate existing processes.
To reinforce this, the Small Business Commissioner would be empowered to penalise persistent late payers with interest and fines, strengthening deterrence against poor practice. The scorecard could also reward primes that invest in British skills – for example, by hiring apprentices, recruiting from NEET groups or partnering with schemes like Defence First year – so that winning major contracts is explicitly tied to contributing to the domestic skills base.
Alongside behaviour reform, the Backing British package would include a one‑stop SME procurement portal on the MoD website, replacing fragmented systems with a simple gateway for smaller firms. This portal would advertise opportunities, walk SMEs through streamlined bidding steps and scale up the use of the neutral vendor model across new areas of business to let them bypass complex prime‑led hierarchies and compete on a level playing field. Data on the geographic spread of spending would be collected through the system, enabling the MoD to track whether contracts genuinely reach regions in need of regeneration.
Finance is the other pillar. A new national Defence Bank, housed as a specialist division within the British Business Bank, would provide government‑backed loans and guarantees to help SMEs cross the gap between prototype and mass production - ensuring that security‑critical British innovators are not lost simply because traditional finance treats them as too risky.
Together, these measures mean defence spending would no longer be seen as something that only benefits a handful of big primes. Instead, it becomes a lever for regional growth, SME innovation and re‑industrialisation - a way to back British businesses while strengthening sovereign capability.
In Detail: Backing British
The Backing British Business package is intended to rebalance the defence market, curb behaviours that inhibit SME growth and ensure UK‑based small firms have a fair chance to compete. The proposals are designed to drive regional and hyperlocal economic growth while strengthening the domestic defence industrial base.
A Scorecard for Prime Behaviour
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) should introduce a Behaviour Scorecard for prime contractors, with their performance on key metrics directly affecting their eligibility for future contracts. The scorecard would assess how well they engage SMEs, the fairness of their intellectual property terms, and their payment performance.
The scorecard should reflect updated definitions of late payment emerging from the Department for Business and Trade’s “Late payments: tackling poor payment practices” consultation. This would include a standard maximum payment period of 60 days, preventing large firms from imposing 90–120‑day terms on SMEs. Because the Government already collects some data on payment performance and related KPIs through existing procurement contracts, implementing the scorecard would require only limited additional administration.
Alongside payment and IP metrics, the scorecard should include requirements on upskilling and recruiting people in Britain. It would benchmark how effectively larger companies invest in apprenticeships and skills relative to smaller businesses. Particular emphasis should be placed on hiring from groups such as NEETs and other under‑represented or “untapped” talent pools, with higher scores awarded to firms that make demonstrable progress. Participation in the Defence First programme could also count positively towards a contractor’s score.
The scorecard should not add new layers of red tape to the procurement process. Instead, it should simplify current practice by drawing together data that is already reported and using it in a clear, transparent scoring system.
In parallel, the Small Business Commissioner should be empowered to penalise persistent late payers with automatic interest (8 per cent above base rate) and fines, as proposed in the Government’s consultation. This would strengthen the deterrent against poor payment practices.
An international point of comparison is the US Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), the federal government’s primary tool for evaluating contractor performance. CPARS rates contractors on criteria such as quality, schedule, cost control and SME subcontracting, with scores feeding directly into decisions on future contract awards.
Frontline Finance for emerging innovators
A new national Defence Bank should be established—ideally as a specialist division within the British Business Bank—to provide UK‑based SMEs and start‑ups with the finance they need to scale. Drawing inspiration from the successful Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS), which achieved repayment rates above 88%, its core purpose would be to address the “valley of death” between prototype and mass production by offering advanced loans backed by a Defence Guarantee Scheme.
This would include cash‑flow financing to bridge extended contract payment periods, helping to ensure SMEs are not undermined by common 90–120‑day terms imposed by large incumbents. While we also recommend reducing the maximum allowed payment period to 60 days, we recognise that this may still prove challenging to some SMEs and this recommendation may not be adopted.
Like CBILS, the government would guarantee 70–80% of losses on qualifying loans (with businesses remaining fully liable for repayment), enabling commercial pricing while absorbing risk and unlocking lender confidence. To qualify for support, businesses would need to demonstrate that their technology addresses a significant security challenge, demonstrate commercial interest. For example, new cyber‑defence tools or drone capabilities and commit to keeping their intellectual property and manufacturing footprint in the UK.
The Defence Bank could be incorporated into the British Business Bank as a ring‑fenced Defence & Security Division, leveraging BBB’s existing infrastructure for guarantees, lender accreditation, and SME outreach. This division would feature defence‑specific governance (including MOD input), tailored products like milestone‑based loans and contract‑bridging facilities, and integration with BBB’s Enterprise Finance Guarantee model—adapted for national security priorities.
By providing this form of government‑backed bridge finance, inspired by CBILS’s high repayment discipline and housed within the BBB for efficiency, the Defence Bank would reduce the risk that high‑potential British innovations are sold abroad due to a lack of domestic capital.
A One-Stop Shop for Procurement
The Ministry should build on its digital infrastructure with a better-promoted and more accessible SME portal on the departmental website to serve as the primary gateway for smaller businesses to navigate defence procurement. This landing page could replace fragmented systems with a simplified, intuitive interface that clearly outlines streamlined bidding steps and step-by-step guides, specifically tailored to the operational scale of SMEs.
Under the oversight of the new Defence Office for Small Business Growth, this portal will prioritise the advertising of new opportunities, ensuring that SMEs have the visibility required to compete directly with larger Prime companies. By standardising plain English guidance and removing prohibitive administrative hurdles, the department will ensure that technical innovation, rather than bureaucratic capacity, dictates contract awards.
Central to this accessible procurement route could be the formal scaling of the neutral vendor model, currently utilised by the Ministry, integrated directly into the backend of the portal, but also potentially expanded beyond its current areas, such as AI and robotics to cover larger areas of service procurement.
By utilising this model, the MOD provides a compliant pathway that allows SMEs to bypass the complex supply chain hierarchies of traditional Primes and engage directly with contract opportunities on a neutral basis.
Included in any contract secured via a Neutral Vendor Model provider should be that they support the Department in collecting data on geographic spread of spending, to ensure the Ministry is well equipped to tackle any regional disparities.
The creation of a one-stop portal integrated with the scaled neutral vendor framework will provide a simple, non-discriminating marketplace for SMEs.
The Sovereign Capability Regime
The Sovereign Capability Regime ensures that when major contracts go overseas, a substantial share of their economic value still comes home to Britain. Under a clear, binding offset regime, international suppliers winning MoD contracts above a set threshold – for example £20 million - would be required to reinvest a fixed proportion of the contract’s economic value into the UK economy.
International practice shows that many defence‑offset regimes expect foreign primes to reinvest between 50% and 100% of a contract’s value in the purchasing country.
The regime would sit alongside the Back British agenda, explicitly directing the benefits of defence procurement towards UK jobs, supply chains and innovation. A team within the MoD would negotiate bespoke offset agreements for each major procurement, monitor delivery and impose penalties where commitments are not met. Exemptions would apply for treaty‑based programmes such as AUKUS or GCAP, and potentially for future defence agreements with close partners to avoid undermining strategic collaborations.
For voters, the logic is straightforward: when major contracts go to foreign suppliers, Britain should still see the economic returns at home.. Offsets make that visible by tying foreign contracts to new jobs in British factories, orders for domestic suppliers and investment in the skills needed for long‑term sovereign capability.
By combining a Backing British package for SMEs with a robust Sovereign Capability Regime for overseas suppliers, defence investment can be clearly understood as money that circulates through British communities, rather than disappearing into distant balance sheets. In this way, the answer to “who really benefits?” becomes much simpler: British workers, British businesses and British places.
In Detail: The Sovereign Capability Regime – Offsetting
The British government should introduce a clear, binding requirement that international suppliers winning major MoD contracts reinvest a defined proportion of the contract’s value into the UK economy. This would help ensure that defence spending directly supports jobs, supply chains and innovation at home.
This kind of offsetting policy is widely used internationally and has several benefits: increased foreign investment, more equitable regional growth, stronger British supply chains and additional high‑quality employment. It would complement the government’s “Back British” approach by directing the benefits of defence procurement explicitly toward British SMEs, skills and innovation.
The MOD could require that purchases of both material and non‑material capabilities above a set threshold, of £20 million, are subject to offset obligations. Under such a policy, foreign companies would be required to reinvest a specified percentage of the economic value of the contract back into the UK over a fixed period.
Many established defence‑offset jurisdictions expect foreign primes to reinvest a substantial share of a contract’s economic value, typically landing somewhere between roughly 50% and 100%. Offsetting, while a useful tool, should be applied proportionally so as not to make the UK market unattractive for foreign firms and a percentage of 50% applied.
To deliver this, the MOD would need to negotiate bespoke offset agreements for each major procurement, balancing required reinvestment with firms’ ability to maintain sustainable profit margins. A, dedicated team within the MOD could oversee these agreements, monitor compliance and impose penalties where commitments are not met.
Exemptions should apply to international treaty‑based programmes such as GCAP and AUKUS, and potentially to any future defence agreements with the European Union.
Part 2
The War on Cyber
Cybersecurity at the frontline of public concern
We are already fighting
2.1
The Playbook
The Cyber Crime Resilience Fund: The public recognises cyberattacks as a pressing threat for the country - one that can bring down business and public services, as well as deeply damage lives. It is the key area to link defence and security to everyday life.A new ring-fenced Cyber Crime Resilience Fund, financed by redirecting 2-4% of the existing Defence Digital budget would channel money into three visible, community-level mechanisms:
Regional Cyber Resilience Centres strengthening the nine existing not-for-profit centres across England and Wales to expand support to individuals and SMEs, and establishing new Cyber Resilience Neighbourhoods that embed trained cyber community leads within local policing teams to identify and respond to local vulnerabilities.
Community Cyber Education targeting support for vulnerable groups including older citizens, newly digitally active communities and schools, delivered through the Regional Centres and a network of trained volunteers drawn from local universities.
A National Cybercrime and Fraud Hotline as a single, MoD-branded reporting and advice service, replacing the current ActionFraud system that nearly half (45%) the public has never heard of. Victims call once, are logged nationally, and connected to local specialists who provide tailored support, following a model similar to Citizens Advice.
When you ask the public what they are most worried about when it comes to security threats, cyber comes first every time. Unprompted in focus groups and a key concern in polling, cybersecurity is the security issue for the public. People have recognised that the frontline of conflict for the UK has shifted - that the disruption they see hitting hospitals, businesses and public services is not random misfortune, but a symptom of a broader, intensifying struggle playing out between states and hostile actors across the world’s digital infrastructure. While defence is near universally seen as “spending money abroad”, cyber is the one exception to that rule. It is the only case where the war is very much at home.
Unlike conventional conflict, cyber insecurity is already experienced by the public everyday. And while it's easy to say that public concern does not necessarily reflect the scale of the real threat, the reality is that a malicious attack on the NHS might as well be a declaration of war. When operations are cancelled, patient records locked and ambulances diverted, the consequences are disastrous - even deadly. Yet today this frontline is funded piecemeal through core budgets and short‑term grants, leaving local services and SMEs exposed.
But recognition of the symptom has not yet produced a full reckoning with the problem. The public understands cyber as a practical threat to the services they rely upon, but focus groups suggested most still see attacks as the work of rogue criminals rather than state-sponsored actors - not yet connecting local disruption to the much larger geopolitical contest in which Britain's digital infrastructure, energy networks and public institutions are themselves the battlefield. A visible Cyber Crime Resilience Fund supporting community services is one of the clearest ways to show defence money going directly into protecting the services and employers people rely on - a response to the same forces that have returned warfare to European soil, and a demonstration that defence spending protects the country not only in the event of a future crisis, but right now.
“I think investing in new technologies is important, because if we are behind on those, then it's going to make it easier for people to hack us. I mean, if you are employing people locally… There might be people who are very good at creating new technologies, you know, in schools, universities, then you can sort of combine those two things. But I think if we're behind on technologies, that is going to have a massive effect. On …how well we're able to fight against the cyber war that is going on around us.”
- Woman, Labour-Reform Switcher, Caerphilly
“I think investing in new technologies is no surprise. [..] Because the nature of war is changing, and I think they have to invest in the new technologies that are coming out, such as the AI and drones and all these things, that is becoming the new nature of war. So I think they're obviously going to look at particularly AI, which is going to be a biggie.”
- Man, Labour-Left Switcher, Scarborough & Whitby
The Cybercrime Resilience Fund
The Cyber Crime Resilience Fund would turn this frontline into a funded national programme. Financed by redirecting a small, fixed share of the existing Defence Digital budget - around 2–4%, equivalent to £42–108 million - the Fund would be permanently ringfenced so that cyber protection for people and businesses cannot be quietly squeezed when other pressures bite.
The Fund has three core pillars. First, it would significantly strengthen Regional Cyber Resilience Centres across England and Wales, allowing them to expand affordable support to SMEs, charities and individuals, and to create “Cyber Resilience Neighbourhoods” with trained cyber leads embedded in local policing teams. Second, it would finance targeted community cyber education for vulnerable groups - older citizens, newly digitally active communities, schools - delivered through the Centres and a network of trained student volunteers. Third, it would create a single National Cybercrime and Fraud Hotline, visibly branded by the Ministry of Defence, that replaces and upgrades the current Action Fraud system so victims call once, are logged nationally and receive tailored local support.
Over half (52%) of the public support such a Fund, with support rising to 67% among Labour‑Left Switchers, and 44% of people believe it would affect their day‑to‑day lives - one of the few defence policies where that is the case. In practice, it would shift a slice of defence spending out of the realm of the abstract and into everyday institutions: the GP surgery hit by ransomware, the small business paralysed by a phishing attack, the pensioner scammed online. In doing so, the Cyber Crime Resilience Fund makes cyber defence legible as a concrete service the state provides to protect people’s livelihoods and public services, not just a technical arms race somewhere in the background.
In Detail: Cyber Crime Resilience Fund (CCRF)
Cybercrime is one of the leading defence and security concerns among the British public, experienced locally and personally and often linked in people’s minds to hostile actors abroad. 54% of the public are worried about the threat of cyberattacks on themselves, with 68% are worried about the threat of cyberattacks on small businesses. A policy that looks to address this will bring defence closer to home.
A new Cyber Crime Resilience Fund (CCRF) would sit at the intersection of national security and community safety, funding various mechanisms designed to bridge the gap between everyday concerns and defence spending.
Cybercrime has skyrocketed in the last few years, with the economy now losing £14.7 billion or 0.5% of GDP in 2025 to cyber attacks, with four in ten businesses and three in ten charities reported having a cybersecurity breach or attack. 81% of all businesses that experience cyber attacks are SMEs. The picture is the same for the wider public, with cybercrime incidents increasing by 37% over the last five years. This economic cost doesn’t account for the huge personal emotional toll for victims and the public wants action taken.
Cybercrime also represents a major challenge to the UK’s national security. Attacks on individuals and small firms without any ties to state goals can be impactful enough on their own to seriously disrupt access to services and general economic activity. The enormous volume of financially motivated attacks cumulatively can hurt economic competitiveness and place a greater and greater strain on cyber defences, all making the prospect of sophisticated successful attacks more likely.
The CCRF should be used not only to build technical capability, but deliberately to make the benefits of defence spending visible to voters. The fund would support civilian‑facing cyber protection: helping individuals, SMEs, safeguarding local public services and providing rapid response assistance via existing intermediaries.
Financing the CCRF
A new CCRF could be financed by redirecting a fixed proportion of the Defence Digital budget, currently £2.7 billion (as of 2022/23) – within a range of 2–4% (£42–108 million) – alongside existing Home Office funding. The Home Office currently supports Regional Cyber Resilience Centres and Report Fraud services. Future supplementary avenues for funding could include revenues generated by crypto‑assets seized from offenders.
The CCRF could fund the following:
Strengthened Regional Cyber Resilience Centres (RCRCs) – with increased support to local businesses, charities, and expanded support to individuals
Cyber Resilience Neighbourhoods – a new Cyber Resilience Neighbourhood support function, with trained Cyber Community Leads in local policing teams identifying local cyber vulnerabilities, supported by a network of volunteers
A New National Cybercrime and Fraud Hotline – a new national reporting service feeding into a national centre to record cases, with a triage function to regional centres providing expert advice to victims; regional teams of assessors and specialists would be based in the Regional Cyber Resilience Centres
This ring-fenced money would shift part of defence spending from military bases into the "real world", supporting individuals, communities and businesses.
Everyday Attacks
2.2
“It's not going to be feet on the floor, right? It's gonna be AI-dominated. That's the future of warfare. So, the onset, you can't diminish the pressing nature of AI, and how that's going to transform so much in terms of defence, so hence, I think not so long ago, you know, the government announced massive, actually American funds into AI, into the UK. So, it's all part and parcel of one another. The whole warfare of the future is going to be transformed.”
- Woman, Labour-Left Switcher, Romford
Voters are correct in their understanding that cyberattacks threaten more than just individuals or unlucky companies. They threaten the economy itself. Cyber policy is therefore not a competing priority to domestic investment in infrastructure and public services, as defence spending is so often understood. Rather, it is core to domestic investment, protecting the institutions and services that keep the country going.
When we asked the public where non-core defence spending should go, their priorities were clear. The top three areas were:
Supporting essential public services (44%);
Cybersecurity and protection from online attacks (40%);
Strengthening border security (39%).
Cybersecurity ranks alongside - and in many cases directly behind - support for the NHS, local councils and other public services. The same pattern appears when voters are asked where government spending would make the biggest difference to their day-to-day lives. Supporting essential public services ranks first (51%), followed by cybersecurity and protection from online attacks (30%). In comparison, strengthening border security and building resilience for important infrastructure both sit at 27%.
Focus group participants frequently linked cyber threats to the functioning of public services and local employers. Hospitals cannot operate if their systems are compromised. Local authorities cannot deliver services if their networks are disrupted. Small businesses may be forced offline entirely. The consequences are not limited to the digital domain - they are felt in cancelled appointments, delayed wages and interrupted supply chains. That's why, while 54% say they are worried about cyberattacks on themselves personally, concern rises sharply when framed in institutional terms - 68% are worried about attacks on small businesses, 68% on large businesses, and 75% on public services. Among Labour-Left Switchers, that figure reaches 86%. The bigger the organisation, the greater the anxiety. People understand, often instinctively, that the systems underpinning everyday life are vulnerable in ways they were not a generation ago.
“Future warfare… It’s not going to be feet on the floor, right? It’s gonna be AI-dominated… You can’t diminish the pressing nature of AI, and how that's going to transform so much in terms of defence… The whole warfare of the future is going to be transformed.”
- Woman, Labour-Left Switcher, Romford
Regional Cyber Resilience Centres
The Cyber Crime Resilience Fund would channel money into a network of strengthened Regional Cyber Resilience Centres across England and Wales, expanding their support from SMEs and charities to individuals and key local institutions.
These centres already exist as not‑for‑profit hubs working with police, academia and the private sector, but they are currently reliant on short‑term Home Office funding. Through the Fund, they would receive multi‑year investment to scale up practical support – cyber health‑checks for small firms, incident response advice for councils and NHS trusts, and hands‑on help for local employers hit by attacks. New “Cyber Resilience Neighbourhoods” would embed trained cyber community leads within local policing teams, backed by volunteers from local universities, to identify hotspots and support vulnerable groups such as older citizens, newly digitally active communities and schools.
For defence investment to command public support in this context, protection must be delivered where disruption is experienced. By visibly funding local cyber resilience teams and neighbourhood schemes through the Cyber Crime Resilience Fund, national security spending starts to look less like a line item in Whitehall and more like practical help for the services and employers people rely on every day. Rather than viewing defence spending as competing with domestic priorities, investment in cyber resilience begins to demonstrate how national security policy can support economic stability and the effective functioning of public services.
In Detail: Regional Cyber Resilience Centres (RCRCs)
Regional Cyber Resilience Centres are not‑for‑profit organisations that provide free or affordable cybersecurity support to SMEs, charities and the third sector. The National Cyber Resilience Centre Group, responsible for overseeing the regional centres, works in close coordination with the Police, the private sector and academia. The nine regional centres across England and Wales are led by local police forces and are well placed to deliver tailored local support. Currently, the centres are funded by the Home Office on a year‑to‑year basis.
We recommend greatly strengthening these regional centres through the CCRF, which would support an expansion of their current remit, facilitate the creation of Cyber Resilience Neighbourhoods and host part of the National Cybercrime & Fraud Hotline. This makes them visible and tangible symbols of defence spending. This would be made possible by a funding boost through the CCRF of a minimum of £42 million spread over a multi‑year basis.
Expanded RCRC funding would include:
Cyber Resilience Neighbourhoods
Cyber harms, like physical crime, cluster geographically, with particular communities repeatedly targeted through fraud, ransomware and social‑engineering campaigns. Cyber Resilience Neighbourhoods would be created by identifying local hotspots through coordination between Regional Centres and the NCSC, and providing targeted support.
Each area would have a trained Cyber Community Lead embedded in local policing teams and supported by a network of trained cyber volunteers, closely linked to the RCRCs. These volunteers could be recruited from local universities, industry professionals, retired practitioners and other community sources, as has already been demonstrated by the current Cyber PATH system within the RCRCs.
RCRCs would also deliver targeted support to vulnerable groups such as older citizens, newly digitally active communities and schools, with enhanced education and guidance. The costs of the Cyber Resilience Neighbourhood function are absorbed within the CCRF.
Facilitation of the National Cybercrime & Fraud Hotline
The increased funding would also be used by the RCRCs to operate regional call centres (as part of the National Cybercrime and Fraud Hotline), serving as the regional point of contact for individuals, SMEs, charities and others affected by cybercrime and fraud after reporting to the national centre occurs. These call centres would provide expert advice with a more local and personalised approach.
National Cybercrime and Fraud Hotline
The National Cybercrime Fraud Hotline would become the primary reporting and advice service for victims, visibly branded by the Ministry of Defence and Home Office but delivered through Regional Cyber Resilience Centres in partnership with policing and existing fraud infrastructure. Victims would call a single national number, have their case logged so law enforcement can track patterns and then be triaged to regional specialists who provide tailored support, following a model similar to Citizens Advice. Replacing and upgrading the current Action Fraud system - which nearly half the public has never heard of, and which receives reports for only one in eight fraud offences - would make support more trusted, more responsive and more obviously connected to defence spending.
This architecture reflects a wider perception that cyber resilience is tied to economic stability - safeguarding the systems that allow businesses to operate and public services to function. Investment in new defence technologies follows a similar pattern: 43% of the public support increased spending in this area, with support rising to 50% among Labour ’24 voters and Labour‑Reform Switchers, and 52% among Labour‑Left Switchers. Cyber capability is understood not only as a defensive measure, but as a means of supporting innovation and growth, particularly when framed as protecting services and employers rather than as an abstract digital arms race.
For policymakers seeking to justify defence spending in a cost‑of‑living crisis, this is vital. Investments that protect public services and support digital infrastructure are far more likely to be viewed as safeguarding existing priorities rather than competing with them, and the Cyber Crime Resilience Fund is a visible means of doing so. By supporting digital security, neighbourhood‑level capability and a national hotline at a local level, it provides a tangible link between defence investment and economic resilience.
Investment in cyber capability demonstrates how protecting the country abroad and supporting people at home are increasingly intertwined. Our geopolitical climate already indicates technological capability may prove as important to national security as conventional military readiness. When systems fail - whether through cyberattack, data breach or supply chain disruption - the consequences are not limited to defence; they are felt in cancelled services, disrupted businesses and reduced productivity. The challenge is therefore not only to invest in new technologies, but to ensure that such investment supports the country’s long‑term resilience.
Cyber capability, in this sense, is not simply about defending against threats. It is about ensuring that Britain retains the means to stand on its own feet in a more competitive and volatile world - and making that resilience visible to the public through the institutions and services funded by the Cyber Crime Resilience Fund.
In Detail: National Cybercrime & Fraud Hotline
A single, national Cybercrime & Fraud Hotline visibly branded by the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office, and promoted through a whole‑of‑society campaign should become the primary reporting and advice service for victims. This would subsume and enhance the existing Report Fraud service, which suffers from a low profile, while making support more visible and trusted.
The new hotline would build on the existing Report Fraud infrastructure and Action Fraud service. Victims would call the national number, where they would be greeted by a national reporting service. This service would log the offence to ensure that law‑enforcement bodies maintain an accurate picture of national crime patterns. Calls would then be transferred to their regional Regional Cyber Resilience Centre, where trained assessors and specialists, following a model similar to Citizens Advice, provide tailored advice, support and signposting.
The national centre would utilise the existing Report Fraud infrastructure, staff and technology, minimising additional setup requirements. However, it is likely that some setup costs will be involved in standing up the new hotline, and these should be budgeted for accordingly. The hotline would be jointly funded by the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence.
The existing Action Fraud service suffers from limited public awareness and perceived relevance, with nearly half of the public stating they were not aware the reporting service existed and the latest Crime Survey data showing that only one in eight fraud offences were reported to the police or the Report Fraud service.
A majority of respondents supported the creation of a new Cybercrime & Fraud Hotline, which would provide a greater localised support function and offer greater support for victims. Partnerships with banks, retailers and other high‑risk sectors would promote the service and could improve information‑sharing.
The Report Fraud service should be incorporated into the new hotline at the earliest opportunity to reduce duplication and cost to the taxpayer. The current Report Fraud system runs at a cost of approximately £39 million per year, including City of London Corporation contributions.
Protecting Larger Public Services and Critical Infrastructure
The government’s Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is a welcome step towards better protection of critical infrastructure and public services. The legislation strengthens requirements for cybersecurity standards and incident reporting and expands the range of bodies covered, while the Government Cyber Action Plan introduces additional standards for public bodies.
The government should explore means to reinforce protections for critical sectors and businesses. Further policy exploration could include mandated cybersecurity insurance in all large procurement contracts, extending beyond the current mandates. Extending full expensing to cybersecurity investments could also be an area of exploration for policymakers in future.
Conclusion
Britain cannot afford to treat defence as something that happens somewhere else, to someone else, at some future point in time. In an era of renewed great‑power competition, everyday cyberattacks and fragile global supply chains, the way we choose to defend the country must also be a way we choose to rebuild it.
This report has shown that the public is well aware that security and prosperity rise and fall together. Voters worry that Britain has lost its edge, doubt that our institutions can withstand shocks, and resent a defence system they instinctively feel sends money to distant primes rather than to the people, places and services they rely on. Yet, they are also open to greater investment when it is clearly linked to good jobs, stronger local economies, safer public services and a more self‑reliant industrial base. The task for the Government is not to persuade people that the world is dangerous; it is to prove that defence spending is part of the answer to the pressures they already feel at home.
Our playbook offers a practical route to that settlement. Defence First would turn defence from an abstract budget line into a visible route into skilled work for young people, particularly those at risk of being left behind. Repurposing surplus MoD land would convert dormant public assets into thousands of new homes and regenerated communities, making defence investment tangible on the streets where people live. The Backing British package and the Sovereign Capability Regime would ensure that when taxpayers fund complex kit, the dividends flow back through British SMEs, supply chains and skills rather than leaking overseas. And a ringfenced Cyber Crime Resilience Fund would move part of the defence budget onto the frontline that people experience most directly: the GP surgery hit by ransomware, the local employer paralysed by an attack, the pensioner scammed online.
Taken together, these reforms rewire defence around the sovereign capabilities that actually hold the country together under pressure - its workforce, industrial base, infrastructure and digital systems. They show that every pound spent on security can also be a pound invested in opportunity and resilience when designed and delivered in the right way. They align defence with the priorities that dominate public concern - the cost of living, the NHS, housing, regional inequality - not by competing with them, but by helping to fix them in a more unstable world. Over time, they offer a basis for a new political contract in which sustained investment in defence is rewarded with visible returns in jobs, homes, safer services and restored pride in Britain's ability to stand on its own feet.
The choice now is whether to continue with a model of defence that is politically fragile and socially remote, or to bring defence home and make it a driver of good growth, shared security and renewed confidence in the United Kingdom. If we match the realism about the threats we face with equal realism about how people live, Britain can once again be a country that not only stands up when it matters, but is visibly stronger because of how it chooses to defend itself.
Appendix
Revenue Generation (Household Licence)
Netflix's clampdown on password sharing in 2023 provides a valuable example of how access-gating the BBC may generate significant revenue for the organisation.
In 2023, Netflix began to clamp down on account sharing between different households. Prior to enforcement, 15% of Netflix users in the US were borrowing someone else's account rather than paying for their own. By 2024, post-account-sharing crackdown, this had fallen to 10%, a one-third (33%) reduction in the non-paying cohort as a proportion of all Netflix users.[17]
Indeed survey data of American consumers found that between 25-30% of 19,000 streamers not paying for accounts surveyed expected to eventually pay for their own account before implementation of the password sharing crackdown.[18]
In the UK, the password sharing crackdown resulted in a 10% increase in paying subscribers among UK Netflix users with the company posting record UK revenues following the password-sharing crackdown.[19]
Netflix enjoyed significant global subscriber growth, adding nearly 30 million net new subscribers globally in 2023, compared to 8.9 million in 2022.[20] Netflix CFO, Spencer Neumann, stated that “Most of our revenue growth this year [2023] is from growth in volume from new paid memberships and that’s largely driven by our paid sharing rollout.”[21] Paid sharing rollout is a direct reference to the password sharing crackdown.
For this estimate, and in the absence of granular data on how many former account borrowers dropped off Netflix entirely versus converted into a paid subscriber, an assumed upper bound of a one-third (33%) reduction in the non-paying cohort is treated as conversion to paying status. In reality some non-payers will have disengaged rather than paid, meaning the true conversion rate is below 33%.
However, there are strong structural reasons to treat 33% as a conservative floor in the BBC context rather than a ceiling. Netflix is a discretionary commercial subscription with numerous direct substitutes. The BBC Household Licence is a statutory obligation for those who use paid BBC services, not a commercial choice. A household that consumes BBC content and refuses to pay following access gating faces loss of access to a public service used almost universally across the country.
The incentive to comply is therefore materially stronger than in the Netflix case. On this basis, applying the 33% conversion rate to the approximately 3.4 million evading households[22] derived from the NAO-audited evasion rate of 12.52% applied to the BBC's 23.8 million licences in force yields a central estimate of approximately 1.12 million additional paying households, generating approximately £202 million in additional annual revenue at the current licence fee rate of £180. This is treated as a deliberately conservative single-point estimate; the true figure is likely higher given the statutory context, but no empirical basis currently exists to quantify the premium with precision.
[17] Leichtman Research Group, ‘10% of streaming video services are borrowed’, Pg 2, March 2024
[18] TheDesk.net , ‘Netflix password sharing crackdown’, October 2023’
[19] TheMediaLeader, ‘Netflix password-sharing crackdown a ‘success’, March 2024
[20] SkyNews, ‘Netflix subscribers surge after crackdown’, January 2024
[21] CNN, ‘Netflix adds nearly 6 million paid subscribers’, July 2023
[22] The 3.4 million evading households is a derived figure, Derived from two NAO-audited figures: 23.8 million licences in force and a 12.52% evasion rate (BBC Television Licence Fee Trust Statement 2024/25). Calculation: 23.8m ÷ 0.8748 = 27.2m licensable base; 27.2m × 12.52% = 3.4 million evading households.
With special thanks to…
Kai Hain
Ben McGowan
Dylan Turner
Jade Azim
Billie Coulson
Louisa Dollimore